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“If we desire a society of peace, then we 
cannot achieve such a society through 
violence. If we desire a society without 
discrimination, then we must not discriminate 
against anyone in the process of building this 
society. If we desire a society that is 
democratic, then democracy must become a 
means as well as an end.” 
(Bayard Rustin) 
 
 ii 
 
University of Tampere  
Faculty of Social Sciences   
MDP in Peace, Mediation and Conflict Research  
GIOVANNA SANCHEZ NIEMINEN – Technology and Society at Automated Borders: 
Risk of Discrimination and Fundamental Rights 
Master’s Thesis, 84 pages  
May 2018 
 
Abstract 
The European Union border control system has been under a series of transformations 
to better adapt to domestic and international pressures. New border technologies are 
in the centre of these transformations. Technological solutions, such as electronic 
gates, biometric identifiers and large-scale data systems are currently being 
implemented for the improvement of the system efficiency and security. 
The present master’s thesis is a contribution to the European Union Horizon 2020 
research project named “BODEGA- Proactive Enhancement of Human Performance 
in Border Control”. It focuses on the recent transformations of the European Union 
border control system, which are leading to an increasing automatization of its tasks. 
The implementation of new border technologies is spreading around the Union 
external borders, without proper assessment of social and ethical impacts. The aim of 
this research is to investigate how new border technologies are affecting and can 
affect fundamental rights, particularly the right of non-discrimination.  
The research has been conducted with the analysis of survey questionnaire’ 
responses given by travellers who recently crossed the Schengen border, in addition 
to the analysis of the results of a public consultation on the Smart Borders, which 
counted with the participation of European public authorities and organisation related 
to migration, border control and fundamental rights. 
Research findings demonstrate that one of the greatest challenges of the European 
Union border management system is to reconcile humanitarian and security aspects 
in the performance of its common tasks. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the 
form in which technological solutions have been designed and implemented can 
reduce the likelihood of some discriminatory practice occurrences, but it can also 
potentially increase the likelihood of others. 
 
Key words: automated border control, technology, European Union, fundamental 
rights, non-discrimination, security. 
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Introduction  
 
Considering the complexities of a border control system in a globalized world 
characterised by a constantly increasing number of individuals moving from East to 
West, North to South in a speed never seen before in the history of mankind, new 
strategies and technologies are being constantly developed to keep the system 
efficient and secure. Automated gates, information based systems and biometric 
identifiers are some of the new technologies adopted by the European Union (EU) 
border control system to respond to the three main challenges of its official border 
check points:  to keep a smooth flow of travellers, efficient security checks and reduced 
budgets.   
In 2015 the world witnessed the harsh reality of what became known as the 
“migration crisis” with the arrival of thousands of individuals seeking protection and 
better prospects of life at the EU external borders. The phenomena brought light to the 
fragilities of the European border control system, which under pressure struggled to 
keep the security of the external borders, the smooth flow of border crossings, and to 
comply with its obligation of providing travellers with a fair treatment and to ensure the 
respect of individuals’ fundamental rights.  
The current reality of EU border control is characterised by the increasing flow 
of travellers entering and exiting the Schengen area, along with a steadily rise in 
number and variety of threats to the EU territory and its citizens. In the eyes of public 
authorities and technical experts, data-based technology is a fundamental tool in such 
a context, enabling to improve border control security and efficiency by providing 
authentic information and identification of travellers. 
 This research arises in a moment in which the EU seeks to enhance the 
performance of its border control with the implementation of large-scale data based 
systems that collects and archives alphanumerical and biometrical data of individuals, 
e-passports and automated gates, also known as e-gates. However, the 
transformations currently taking place in various EU external border check points are 
occurring without proper assessment of ethical and social impacts, in what seems to 
be a rather rash attempt to enhance border security.  
In 2014, the European Commission opened a call for research on the ethical 
and societal dimensions of border control through its research and innovation 
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programme Horizon 2020. The BODEGA – Proactive Enhancement of Human 
Performance in Border Control research project coordinated by VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland was created as an answer to this call. It focuses 
specifically on the human factor of the EU border control system and on changes that 
the introduction of technology brings to travellers’ experience and to the work of border 
guards. BODEGA is funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 and aims to 
improve border efficiency, security and travelling experience by gathering expertise 
and creating recommendations for the development of future border control checks.   
The present master’s thesis is a contribution to the BODEGA project and it aims 
to investigate and analyse the possible impacts that technologies being developed 
and applied in border control tasks can bring for individuals’ fundamental rights, 
especially regarding the right of non-discrimination. In this sense, this research will 
contribute to BODEGA’s development of value-oriented results and recommendations 
for future “Smart Borders” and EU border management, in order to ensure that security 
and efficiency will not be enhanced at the expense of fundamental rights. As a 
contribution to the BODEGA project this research will follow the European Code of 
Conduct for Research Integrity1 and the Horizon 2020 Ethical Principles2. 
This research will specifically aim to investigate and analyse the impacts of new 
technologies applied in the border control system regarding the protection of 
fundamental rights at borders, particularly the right of non-discrimination. With the 
increasing usage of technology in border checkpoints it is important to ensure the just 
treatment of travellers. The European Union was built in multicultural bases and it has 
in its core values openness and respect for diversity of European societies. European 
borders must reflect those values by being inclusive and respecting the diversity of 
travellers, regardless if they are Europeans or non-Europeans.  
To achieve this research purpose and successfully reply to its fundamental 
question of “How the implementation of new technologies is affecting and will affect 
the issue of discrimination in border control practices?”, a methodological plan was 
devised taking into consideration the limitations of time and length of a master’s thesis.  
                                                          
1 ALLEA – All European Academies. The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (Berlin: ALLEA, 2017). 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/hi/h2020-ethics_code-of-conduct_en.pdf 
2Official Journal of the European Union. Regulation (Eu) No 1291/2013 Of The European Parliament And Of The 
Council,  2013. http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/legal_basis/fp/h2020-eu-
establact_en.pdf#page=11 
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Both primary and secondary sources of data will be used to generate a deeper 
understanding of the EU border system complexities and to further uncover omitted 
issues.  The data will present the experiences of travellers crossing the EU external 
borders, including Europeans and third-country nationals, the opinions and 
expectations of EU public authorities, and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations related to areas of migration, border control, fundamental rights and data 
protection.  
The present thesis will be divided in three main chapters.  The first chapter will 
present a brief historical and theoretical background of the transformations occurred 
in the European border control system until 2017. The historical and theoretical 
background will be followed by descriptions of the main information systems currently 
being used along with critical discussions on the promotion of the idea of threats to 
internal security coming from abroad, framing migration as a security issues. Insights 
on the current domestic and international contexts, including main threats to the 
security of the EU and its citizens will also be presented. To finalise this first chapter 
a description of the Smart Borders Package with its main characteristics, objectives 
and components will be shown along with a critical analysis of its structure and 
impacts.  
Research methods and data compose the second chapter, starting with a 
general introduction to this research’s methodology followed by two sub-chapters 
which will present an in depth look into the BODEGA Travellers Survey and the Public 
Consultation on the Smart Borders, along with the methods of data collection and 
analysis used for each of them, their limitations, results and discussions of the findings. 
The third chapter will be partially a continuation of the discussion of findings from both 
sources, relating them with the literature and theoretical framework presented in the 
first chapter. Moreover, the current state of surveillance in Europe and border control 
exclusionary practices will be discussed, along with considerations on the right of non-
discrimination. The chapter will include legal definitions of discriminatory practices, a 
critical evaluation on the notion of technology neutrality and ethical considerations for 
the development of a responsible research within the context of border control.  
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1. Border Control in the European Union 
 
Border control can be generally described as measures taken by countries to regulate 
and control the movements of people and goods at their borders. Despite the general 
tendency to associate border control exclusively to official border crossing check 
points, it is a very complex activity that comprises a variety of tasks from document 
verification to humanitarian aid.  
An official definition of border control is presented in the Practical Handbook for 
Border Guards, also known as the Schengen Handbook, as follows: “‘Border control’ 
is the activity carried out at a border in response exclusively to an intention to cross or 
the act of crossing the border, regardless of any other consideration, consisting of 
border checks and border surveillance.” 3. 
Currently, the significance of border control goes beyond migration and asylum 
policies, including security concerns, law enforcement, tourism, global trade, search 
and rescue operations, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), data 
privacy and protection. 
In the context of the European Union (EU), the complexity of border control is 
even more intricate with different regulations for internal borders and external borders. 
These regulations are applicable for the majority, but not all Member-States, and for 
some non-EU States. This study will focus exclusively at the EU external border 
control, which takes place at the Schengen external borders. 
 Internal border controls were extinguished in the European Union in a process 
that started in 1985 when Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic of Germany signed the Schengen agreement for the gradual end of 
border checks performed at their common borders4. Nowadays, most of the EU 
Member States integrate what is called Schengen Area, along with four non-EU States 
- Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Within the Schengen Area, any 
person regardless of their nationality can freely move from one country to another 
                                                          
3  Commission of the European Communities. Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook). 
(Brussels: European Union, 2006). Last Modified: Nov 9, 2016. 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015010%202006%20INIT 
4 Sarah Leonard. “Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Critical 
Assessment.” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 2-3, 2015. 306-332. 
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without being subject to border control checks, once they have crossed into the 
Schengen border5.  
 
IMAGE 1: Current map of the Schengen Area6 
 
Through the years the free movement of people and goods inside the Schengen 
Area was consolidated with new Member States joining the EU and adopting the 
Schengen agreement. Simultaneously, during the process of flexibilization of internal 
border control, EU external borders were increasingly reinforced, especially in 2004 
after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, border control became one of the cornerstones of 
EU counter-terrorism policy. 
The transformative process of the European borders that started with the 
signature of the Schengen agreement was followed by other agreements, treaties and 
conventions establishing new regulations for the EU migration policy, such as the 
Palma Documents (1989), the Dublin Convention (1990) and the Seville Summit 
(2002)7. As pointed out by scholars of the Paris School of Security Studies, this 
transformation process resulted in setting migration and border control as 
                                                          
5 European Commission, Schengen Area (May 10, 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en 
6 Image source: European Commission, Europe without borders: The Schengen area. (Directorate-General for 
Migration and Home Affairs, 2015). doi:10.2837/78709. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf / 
7 Georgia Papagianni, Institutional and policy dynamics of EU migration law. (Boston; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006). 
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transnational and technical questions to be dealt with by experts, instead of national 
and political questions which they previously were8.  
As seen in the practices of EU agencies, with this transformation border control 
and migration became risk management issues rather than solely security issues, by 
seeing them through the lenses of technological solutions, risk scenarios and 
assessments. One of the main concerns raised regarding a technical risk management 
perspective for border management is the empowerment of risk experts to a level in 
which they are responsible to make decisions and to create strategies that will further 
limit the space for politics in the area9.  
After the 2004 attacks, the EU border control system went through another 
series of transformations in its regulations and practices aiming to preserve internal 
security. The Madrid terrorist attacks were characterized by the death of more than 
190 people10 and the involvement of Moroccans, Spanish, Syrians, Algerians, a 
Lebanese and a Tunisian in its preparation11. Some of the major changes made in the 
aftermath of the attacks were the creation of Frontex in 2004 and the implementation 
of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) in 2006. 
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Border of the Member States of the European Union, commonly referred as 
Frontex, started its operations in 2005. Its original main task was to coordinate 
operational cooperation between Member States in external border management 
activities, contributing to a better allocation of resources and ensuring the protection 
of freedom, security and justice in the EU territory12. In 2011, the agency strengthened 
its capacities and received the new task of developing and operating an information 
system for the exchange of classified information, including personal data, between 
relevant agencies of the European Union related to the security of external borders13.  
                                                          
8 D. Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control”. In Controlling Frontiers: Free 
Movement into and Within Europe. Ed. D. Bigo and E. Guild (London: Ashgate, 2005), 49-99. 
9 D. Bigo, “Globalized (In)Security: The field and the Ban-Opticon”. In Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal 
practices of liberal regimes after 9/11. Ed. D. Bigo, and A. Tsoukala (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 10 - 48. 
10 Paul Hamilos. “The worst Islamist attack in European history”. The Guardian. (2007). Out 14, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/31/spain 
11“Madrid bombing suspects”. BBC News. (2005). 14 out, 2017. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3560603.stm 
12 Frontex. Risk Analysis for 2016. (Warsaw: European Union, 2016).  doi:10.2819/416783. 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf 
13 Sarah Leonard. Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy, 306-332. 
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The name of the agency changed in 2016 to the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency to better adapt to its new responsibilities, but its common name Frontex 
was maintained. The agency budget was increased, it gained more staff and 
responsibilities regarding migration and internal security, including assessing the 
vulnerabilities of national border authorities in the EU and developing 
recommendations14. Frontex obtained more autonomy and became able to deploy 
border and coast guards rapidly in areas where they are needed, to collect and 
process personal data and to increase its participation in return activities15.  
 The SBC was implemented in 2006 as a regulation for the legislative part of 
the EU integrated border management policy, and it summarizes the rules applied for 
all individuals crossing the EU external and internal borders, including travellers’ 
fundamental rights and how border checks should be conducted by border guards16. 
 Regarding the external borders, two types of border checks are specified in the 
SBC, the minimum check that EU citizens and their family members must undergo 
when crossing the Schengen border, and the thorough checks which non-EU nationals 
are subjected to, along with a description of all the requirements necessary for them 
to enter the Schengen Area.  
The minimum check is conducted exclusively for the purpose of verifying the 
passenger’s identity, while the thorough check verifies not only the identity, but also 
purpose and duration of the stay, if there are sufficient financial means for the period 
the passenger is intending to stay and if all travel documents necessary are presented. 
Border guards can also question third country nationals, and search their identities 
through national and international databases to verify if the passenger does not 
represent a threat to internal security, public health or the international relations of EU 
countries17.   
What is seen nowadays in the European Union border control system as well 
as in other regions of the Western world is a form of governmentality called “Ban-
opticon”. The concept of Ban-opticon was created by Didier Bigo, one of the leading 
academics of the Paris School of Security Studies, to describe a different form of 
                                                          
14 Frontex. Risk Analysis for 2017. (Warsaw: European Union, 2017).  doi:10.2819/250349. 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf 
15 Ibid. 
16 European Parliament, Schengen Borders Code (2014). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14514 
17 Ibid. 
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surveillance and control of people’s movements in the era of globalization. Unlike the 
“Panopticon” idea developed by Jeremy Betham in his study of prison systems, in 
which an extended system of control and surveillance was applied for an entire 
population, the Ban-opticon is characterised for targeting only certain groups of 
individuals to be subjected to increased control and surveillance, while facilitating the 
movement of the majority18. 
The Ban-opticon is defined by three characteristics: exceptionalism, profiling 
and containment of foreigners and normalization of the non-excluded by creating 
normative imperatives19. As explained by Bigo20, this concept allows us to analyse the 
bodies of discourses related to migration, the institutions, infrastructures, laws and 
regulations which compose the current European border control system. Most 
importantly the Ban-opticon enlightens the current global agenda for border control, in 
which the smooth flow of travellers and a high level of security are prioritized, in a way 
that surveillance is presented as necessary but it only targets a small number of 
individuals who are considered to be “abnormal”, risky, potential criminals and 
therefore unwelcome. The discourses of free movement presented by European 
authorities plays a central role in this structure, by normalizing the majority and 
enabling increased surveillance for a minority that is justified as a necessity for the 
management of societal risks21. 
In the current context an extended surveillance, like in the Panopticon, would 
be extremely costly, difficult to justify and be accepted by the public opinion and it 
would compromise the dynamics of international commerce in the global age. In the 
Ban-opticon it is possible to sustain the four freedoms of circulation (goods, services, 
capital and individuals) while increasing control and surveillance through the extensive 
use of technologies of identification, which shares information across different 
agencies operating in the border control system22.  
The Paris School of Security Studies was created aiming to overcome the 
limitations of the Securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School, which 
                                                          
18 Bigo, Globalized (In)Security: The field and the Ban-Opticon. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
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focused mainly on discourse analysis, since it understands security as a speech act23. 
The Paris School on the contrary focuses on institutions, practices and technologies, 
and it argues that security practises define what is security24. Therefore, to better 
understand the Ban-opticon structure applied in Europe and the security environment, 
it is important to look at the current practices and key elements of the border control 
system, specially the increasing adoption of data systems which became a key 
element for surveillance and control of individuals.    
 
1.1 Information Systems and Border Control 
 
The globalization era is known for a constantly increasing interdependence between 
States, freedom of movement and a dynamic global trade environment, but it is also 
known as a time marked by fear and uncertainty, in which local problems quickly 
become global problems.  Identity and identification means have become priorities, 
the ability to tell who is who and to access authentic and verifiable information of 
individuals and groups has gained increasing significance for the States and law 
enforcement agencies, especially after terrorism became a global security problem25. 
The current border control system is characterised by the use of technological 
solutions and information systems focused on the identification of individuals. They 
gradually became essential tools for the EU security and border management 
activities, by providing solutions for the improvement of communication exchange and 
cooperation between Member States, security of identity documents, and for 
strengthen external border controls. Recent developments in EU border control policy 
comprise the increasing adoption of databases, surveillance systems, biometrics and 
automated border control (ABC) systems, with the Schengen Information System 
(SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS) being the most important and used 
systems in the daily practices of border control tasks.  
                                                          
23 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998) 
Didier Bigo. "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – 
Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts." Security Dialogue 45, no. 3, 2014. 209-225. 
24 Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild. Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe, (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005). 
25 A. Ceyhan, “Policing by Dossier: Identification and Surveillance in an Era of Uncertainty and Fear”, In 
Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and Within Europe. Ed. D. Bigo and E. Guild (London: Ashgate, 2005), 
209-232.  
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The Schengen Information System (SIS) consists of large-scale data system 
composed by a central system (C-SIS) and national databases (N-SIS) from each 
country operating within it26. Law enforcement, visa and judicial authorities can access 
and use the information contained in the system for verifying missing or wanted 
persons and objects, such as passports, identity documents, vehicles and weapons. 
It is a hit/no hit type of system which enables the authorities to verify the existence of 
alerts emitted for individuals and objects. In the case of a hit, the system also gives 
instructions for the authorities on how to proceed with the individual or object found. 
The aim of SIS is to facilitate the cooperation between country participants regarding 
the collection and exchange of information related to the preservation of Schengen 
States internal security. The SIS is one of the systems used during thorough checks 
at border check points, which before 2017 were only conducted on third country 
nationals.  
The second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) became 
operational in 2013 and it differentiates from the previous SIS by including biometric 
features for the identification of individuals, providing inter-linked alerts and allowing 
Europol and Eurojust to access and search data in the system27.  
Another large-scale information system that has been used in EU border control 
activities since 2011 is the Visa Information System (VIS). The development of the VIS 
was part of a plan approved by the Council of the European Union in 2002 for 
combating illegal immigration and human trafficking in the EU28. Similarly to SIS, the 
VIS was created for the exchange of information among Member States, this time 
specifically related to visa. It also has a central system (CS-VIS), and national 
databases in each participant state (NI-VIS) linked to the central system. The VIS 
allows the EU border control authorities to verify the authenticity of visas presented at 
border check points and if the traveller is the rightful holder, by connecting and 
exchanging information between consulates in non-European states and external 
border check points in the entire Schengen Area. Data provided by the traveller during 
the application process, fingerprints, digital photograph and previous visa applications 
                                                          
26 Sarah Leonard. Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy, 306-332. 
European commission, Schengen Information System (2018). https https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en 
27 Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (Council of the European Union, 
2007). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007D0533 
28 Leonard, Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy. 
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are recorded in the system for 5 years and can be used during border check 
processes29.  
With VIS it is possible to prevent the practice of visa shopping, in which a single 
individual has multiple visa applications, and in the case of asylum seekers it can also 
be used to determine which EU Member State is responsible for the asylum 
application. Under specific circumstances access of data recorded in the system can 
be granted to national authorities and Europol for conducting investigations on 
terrorism and other criminal activities30.  
With these brief explanations of two large-scale data systems used in the EU, 
some important aspects can be observed. Access to information collected and stored 
in the systems is given to agencies and authorities also working outside the scope of 
border control, such as Europol and Eurojust. Critics of the current border control 
policies of the EU often point out problems related to this aspect of the systems, such 
as loss of privacy and misuse of data that has been granted for the exclusive purpose 
of border control, which can lead to abusive practices towards individuals or groups31.  
Another aspect very characteristic of the current border control system is the 
deallocation of border control tasks outside the territorial border to far distant places. 
It occurs through consulates responsible to collect data and biometrics of visa 
applicants, and by cooperation with different States’ authorities for conducting 
background and identity checks. The responsibility of verifying passports is transferred 
to airline companies that are also required to provide passenger’s information 
collected during the process of booking and check-in32. The passenger’s information 
collected by airline companies are stored in a data system named Passenger Name 
Record (PNR), which is seen by EU law enforcement authorities as an important tool 
in the prevention of serious crimes and counter-terrorism33.  
In the aftermath of the Madrid attacks in 2004, the already existing notion of the 
“enemy within” has been increasingly intensified, which once again reinforced the 
                                                          
29 European commission, Visa Information System (VIS) (2018). Accessed in 15 oct 2017. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-information-system_en 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ceyhan, Policing by Dossier. 
Maegan Hendow, et al. “Using Technology to Draw Borders: Fundamental Rights for the Smart Borders 
Initiative.” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 13, 2015. 39-57. 
32 Bigo, Globalized (In)Security: The field and the Ban-Opticon.  
33 European commission, Passenger Name Record (PNR) (2018). Accessed in 01 jan, 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/information-exchange/pnr_en 
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necessity for law enforcement authorities to efficiently identify those who are exiting 
and entering the territory. The concern over “risky people” has been emphasised 
through political discourses and media outlets repeatedly over the years, shaping the 
public opinion while providing justification for the extensive use of identification 
technologies, increasing surveillance and control over targeted groups34.   
In a global level, the perception of threats to internal security coming from 
abroad, and therefore the necessity of improving external border controls in order to 
preserve the integrity of the states and its citizens against foreign threats, were ideas 
originally promoted by the United Nations in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
In the Resolution 1373 adopted by the United Nations Security Council on September 
28th, 2001, it was decided that all states shall ‘Prevent the movement of terrorists or 
terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers 
and travel documents […]’35.  
The link established between security and immigration in the political discourse 
by state authorities, international organizations and the media has been increasingly 
criticized for endangering the respect for fundamental rights and democratic values, 
for promoting the image of the foreigner as a potential threat and enhancing divisions 
and discrimination within societies36. As explained by Anastassia Tsoukala37: 
 
“[…] the transformation of immigration into a threat to the EU 
societies has provoked confusions between legal and illegal 
migrants and/or between foreigners and nationals of ethnic or 
religious membership other than the one dominant in a given 
country, having thus created a climate of suspicion which aims 
indistinctly at all “foreigners”.” 
 
                                                          
34 Anastassia Tsoukala, “Looking at immigrants as enemies”, In Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and 
Within Europe. Ed. D. Bigo and E. Guild (London: Ashgate, 2005), 92-161. 
35 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373. 2001. 
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/databases/recommended-international-practices-codes-and-
standards/united-nations-security-council-resolution-1373-2001/ 
36 Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich. Immigration, Integration and Security – America and Europe in 
Comparative Perspective. Ed. A.C. d'Appollonia and S. Reich (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 203-228. 
Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
Leonard, Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy. 
37 Tsoukala, Looking at immigrants as enemies. 
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In European societies, threats related to migrants are mostly regarded to social 
stability, cultural homogeneity, employment, sustainability of the welfare state and 
general quality of life. According to Tsoukala38, the transformation of migrants in a 
social threat starts with the assumption that members of a certain population group 
have malicious and immoral inherent traits, which are related to socio-economic or 
political problems in the society. Once this relation is established, migrants are seen 
as a cause or aggravating factor of societal problems, and their representation become 
based on pre-existing stereotypes instead of facts.   
The climate of suspicion towards the figure of the foreigner creates space for 
unlawful practises of discrimination and exclusion to happen even before the person 
has been granted permission to cross the border.   
 
1.2 Current reality of EU border control and terrorism  
 
To understand the complex reality of EU border control, it is important to acknowledge 
the current regional and international context in which the EU border control is set in. 
With the advance of globalization, the flow of travellers crossing European borders for 
business, tourism and studies purposes increases every year, especially in airport 
border check points with a growing number of low-cost flight companies offering tickets 
with reduced prices. Another factor that contributes for the increasing flow of 
passengers crossing the EU external borders is the expansion of the visa liberalisation 
policy and recent border traffic agreements, especially with Western Balkan 
countries39.   
The number of economic migrants, legal and unauthorised, continues to grow 
with the increasing disparity of opportunities and quality of life between developed and 
developing countries, this include migrants coming from distant places like Asia, 
Eastern and Middle Africa, and South America, but also from neighbouring countries 
as the Balkans and Russia40.  
The flow of asylum seekers fleeing from violence and persecution is unlikely to 
be significantly reduced as the number of intrastate conflicts happening around the 
                                                          
38 Tsoukala, Looking at immigrants as enemies. 
39 Frontex, Risk Analysis 2016. 
40 Ibid. 
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world is still high41. In 2016, 102,330 people were killed in organized violence, in which 
87,018 were caused by state-based violence, marking it as one of the deadliest years 
for conflict related violence since the Rwanda genocide42.  
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 1.2 
million asylum applications were received by EU Member States in 2015, with 
Germany and Sweden together receiving half of the applications43. During the same 
year, 1.8 million attempts of illegal entry were identified at the Schengen external 
borders, a number composed by mostly Syrians fleeing from the horrors of the civil 
war and violence promoted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in a total 
of 594,059 people, followed in numbers by 267,485 Afghans44.  
In the case of Syrian nationals, it is difficult to determine the exact number of 
people arriving in the EU, since other migrants also claim to have Syrian nationality in 
order to facilitate their asylum process and guarantee their refugee status. Confirming 
the identity of thousands of poorly documented migrants is one of the main challenges 
for the European border control authorities nowadays.   
This security gap has already shown its dangerous consequences, in 
November 2015 a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris left 130 dead and 
more than 100 injured45. The ISIL claimed responsibility for the attacks and two 
terrorists involved entered the EU with fraudulent Syrian documents claiming to be 
asylum seekers46.  
A few months later, in March 2016, other series of terrorist attacks killed 32 
people in Brussels, IS once again claimed responsibility and it is believed that the 
attacks were connected with those in Paris, with some of the suspects being part of 
the same IS network47. At least 14 suspects of both series of terrorist attacks were 
either Belgians or Belgium residents48. After Paris and Brussels until October 2017, 
                                                          
41 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Accessed in 24 oct, 2017.  
http://ucdp.uu.se/ 
42 Ibid. 
43 UNHCR Global Report 2015, 2016. Accessed in 24 oct, 2017.  http://www.unhcr.org/574ed7b24.html 
44 Frontex, Risk Analysis 2016. 
45 “Paris attacks: What happened on the night”, BBC News.  Last Modified in 9 Dec, 2015. Accessed in 24 oct, 
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994 
46 Frontex, Risk Analysis 2016. 
47 “Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks”, BBC News. Last Modified in 9 Apr, 
2016. Accessed in 24 oct, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985 
48 Larry Buchanan, and Haeyoun ParK, “Uncovering the Links Between the Brussels and Paris Attackers”. The 
New York Times. Accessed in 24 oct, 2017. 
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more than 13 attacks occurred in different European countries, conducted using a 
variety of methods and weapons, but the suspects list follow the same pattern, 
including both EU and non-EU citizens49.  
Through the years it became more evident that the idea of terrorist threats 
having an exclusively external nature was not in accordance with the reality of 
European Union. Security strategies for countering terrorism and other kinds of 
criminal activities focusing on third country nationals proved to be insufficient to 
preserve the integrity of the EU territory and the safety of its citizens, since terrorism 
is as domestic as a foreign problem.  
In the end of 2015, due to increasing terrorist threats of jihadist nature against 
EU Member States and rising number of terrorist attacks, the Council of the European 
Union called for a revision of the SBC, in order to better adjust the regulation to the 
current security reality50. One of the main concerns of the Council was to develop a 
proper response to the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, who can have a European 
passport and benefit from the rights of free movement inside the EU and be subjected 
to a minimum check when crossing the external borders.  
After the call, the European Commission presented a regulation amending the 
SBC, to establish that every person must undergo thorough checks regardless of their 
nationality during the processes of entry and exit of the Schengen external borders51. 
It is a significant change in the EU border control system, since previously only third 
country national (TCN) were subjected to thorough checks while entering the EU, in 
which the passengers’ information were systematically checked in different databases, 
including the Interpol database for lost and stolen documents, in order to ensure that 
the person does not represent a threat to internal security. With the advent of foreign 
fighters and the involvement of European citizens in terrorist attacks, EU citizens and 
their family members started to be seen as a potential threat to the Union itself. As 
explained in a press release issued by the Council of the European Union52 at the time 
the Council adopted the regulation for the SBC amendment:  
                                                          
49 “Terror attacks in Europe”, RTE (2017). Accessed 24 oct, 2017. 
https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2017/0817/898178-europe-terror-attack-timeline/   
50 European Council, Schengen borders code: Council adopts regulation to reinforce checks at external borders 
(2017). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07-regulation-reinforce-checks-
external-borders/ 
51 European Council, Schengen Borders Code: agreement to reinforce checks at external borders (2018). 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/07-systematic-checks/ 
52  European Council, Schengen borders code: Council adopts regulation to reinforce checks at external borders. 
 16 
 
 
“The amendment obliges member states to carry out systematic 
checks against relevant databases on all persons, including 
those enjoying the right of free movement under EU law (i.e. EU 
citizens and members of their families who are not EU citizens) 
when they cross the external borders. The databases against 
which checks will be carried out include the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) and Interpol's database on stolen and 
lost travel documents (SLTD). The checks will also enable 
member states to verify that those persons do not represent a 
threat to public policy, internal security or public health. This 
obligation shall apply at all external borders (air, sea and land 
borders), both at entry and exit.” 
 
The Council of the EU and the European Parliament adopted regulations in 
March 2017 for the amendment, obliging all Member States to conduct systematic 
checks for all travellers at their external borders53. The reinforced checks started at 
the beginning of April 201754. 
In June of 2017, Europol released its 10th EU Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report. Some major trends presented by Europol are directly connected to the border 
control system and its tasks of protection of the EU and its citizens. One of the trends 
is related to the flow of European citizens to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq joining 
terrorist groups, and the return of these individuals to Europe. It is estimated that 
around 5,000 Europeans have travelled to those areas to become foreign terrorist 
fighters in groups like the ISIL 55.  
Due to an increase in military defeats and difficulties to access ISIL controlled 
territories, the number of Europeans going to conflict areas is decreasing56. Moreover, 
the number of returnees is on the rise and this trend is expected to continue for the 
                                                          
53 European Council, Schengen Borders Code: agreement to reinforce checks at external borders. 
54 The Republic of Slovenia Ministry of the Interior Police. Systematic border checks of all travellers at external 
Schengen borders to start on 7 April (Slovenia, 2017). 
55 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2017). https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-
services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 
56 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 
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next years, especially with the possible collapse of ISIL, that have already lost 
significant parts of its controlled territories57.  
Foreign terrorist fighters represent a serious threat to the EU member states. 
They have received military training, ideological instruction, have knowledge about the 
use of explosives and weapons, and have been exposed to extreme levels of violence 
on a daily basis. As returnees, they tend to strengthen local jihadist movements, 
demonstrate significant levels of violence and brutality, and possibly perpetrate 
terrorist attacks in their country of origin. It is imperative for the security of EU member 
states that returnees are effectively identified during border checks before entering the 
Schengen Area. 
The variety of threats and criminal activities occurring within the current border 
control context is wide and besides terrorist threats it includes: drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, migrant smuggling, document fraud, smuggling of weapons and exit of 
stolen vehicles.  Ensuring a continuously functioning and effective border control 
system in such a complex scenario is a priority for the EU that sees technological 
solutions as a key element for this task.  
 
1.3 Smart Borders 
 
The Smart Borders Package was proposed by the European Commission for the first 
time in 2013 as a set of three legislative proposals: creation of the Entry/Exit System 
(EES), development of a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) and an amendment 
of the SBC to include the changes promoted by the two new systems58. The proposals 
aimed to quicken border crossings, strengthen border check processes and improve 
the capacity of SIS and VIS with the adoption of smart technologies. As with SIS and 
VIS, the two new systems would be controlled by the EU Agency for large-scale IT 
systems (eu-LISA) that is responsible for maintenance, efficient exchange of data 
among national authorities, separation of data between different systems and data 
protection59.  
                                                          
57 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 
58 European Parlament, Legislative Train - Towards A New Policy On Migration: Registered Traveller 
Programme (2013 Smart Borders Package) (2013). Accessed in 02 feb, 2018. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-registered-
traveller-programme-(2013-smart-borders-package) 
59 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
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 The EES is expected to be operational in 2020, and it records data of all TCNs 
crossing the Schengen external borders for short stay visits, including past refusals of 
entry, and registers the date and place of entry and exit in order to identify 
overstayers60. This new system will substitute manual stamping of passports and it will 
record biometric data of all TCNs traveling to and from the Schengen area.  
The RTP gives the possibility for TCNs to use electronic gates, also known as 
e-gates, and to benefit from faster border crossings after a voluntary pre-registration 
process, which includes the gathering of biometric data such as fingerprints, besides 
travellers’ personal information61. The target users are business and other frequent 
travellers who are considered to be “low risk” according to criteria such as purpose of 
travel, sufficient financial means and travel history. However, in 2016 a reviewed 
Smart Border Package proposal was presented by the European Commission, in 
which the 2013 proposal for the development of the RTP in a EU level was withdraw, 
but member States were given the possibility to enact their own RTP systems62.  
Germany and Netherlands have already developed their own RTP systems, 
which are currently being used at some of their busiest airports. The registration for 
the programme is free and available for TCNs who are holders of e-passports from 
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada and the 
United States of America63.  
Biometrics are an essential component of the Smart Borders Package and of 
the current EU border management system that prioritizes the ability to effectively 
identify individuals. They are seen by many security experts as the most accurate tool 
of identification and vital to the fight against fraudulent documents and identity theft64. 
In the early 2000s, the use of biometrics for border control purposes in EU gained 
strength with the development of e-passports, which contain digitalized facial image 
                                                          
60 European Council, Entry-exit system: final adoption by the Council (2017). Accessed 25 jan, 2018. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/20/entry-exit-system-final-adoption-by-
the-council/ 
61 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
62 Taylor, Benjamin. “Developing Qualitative Criteria for Assessing the Impacts and Acceptability of Border 
Control Technology” (Masters thesis, University of Tampere, 2016). 
http://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/99591/GRADU-1471257059.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
63 Federal Police, EasyPASS-RTP. 2018. Accessed 02 feb, 2018. 
https://www.easypass.de/EasyPass/EN/EasyPASS-
RTP/rtp_node.html;jsessionid=84FB35CEEDD5DD5BBBCE8472B1F9DBE1.2_cid297 
Schipol Amsterdam Airport. Registered Traveller Programme. 2018. Accessed In 02 feb, 2018. 
https://www.schiphol.nl/en/page/registered-traveller-programme/ 
64 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
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and fingerprints of their holders65. The most common forms of biometric data being 
currently used for border control purposes are iris and retina recognition, besides facial 
recognition and fingerprints. 
Examples of biometrics being used for border control procedures can be found 
all over the globe. For instance, Dubai airport has the largest and oldest iris recognition 
system and its automated gates are available also for passengers with disabilities66. 
Canada has a globally recognized traveller’s register system, and the United States is 
currently expanding the use of biometric identifiers at border check points located in 
its busiest international airports67.     
At the border check point, passengers’ biometric data previously collected 
during the visa or passport application are compared to the person presenting the 
travel documents by a border guard or e-gates that will read and verify the passenger’s 
information through a passport scanner. In the case of TCNs pre-registered to the RTP 
system, a machine-readable token in the form of a card containing passenger’s 
information would be presented and verified at the e-gates68.  
The “Smart Borders” reaffirms the Ban-opticon form of governmentality being 
currently applied in Europe, by creating further divisions between travellers and 
therefore refining even more the surveillance and control at the EU borders. With a 
system like the RTP, the division of travellers between EU and non-EU citizens 
established with the creation of the Schengen Area is surpassed by a newer division 
of TCNs that are considered to be “high-risk” or “low-risk” travellers. As in the case of 
EU and non-EU citizens, the distinction between “high-risk” and “low-risk” travellers 
implies different rights for individuals of each group, and it reinforces once again the 
perception of security threats coming from abroad. Foreigners, especially the poor 
ones who have no access to the RTP system or even e-passports, will face reinforced 
controls while the movement of others will be facilitated.  
                                                          
65 Elin Palm, "Conflicting Interests in the Development of a Harmonized EU E-Passport." Journal of Borderlands 
Studies 31, no. 2 (Apr 2, 2016): 203-16. Accessed 2 feb, 2018. doi:10.1080/08865655.2016.1181982.  
66 Tracey Caldwell. “Market Report: Border Biometrics”. Biometric Technology Today, no.5 (2015): 5-11. 
Accessed 03 feb, 2018. doi://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-4765(15)30079-5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 European Commision, Proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council establishing a 
Registered Traveller Programme (Brussels: European Union, 2013) https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/borders/docs/1_en_act_part1_v14.pdf 
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The logic of the Ban-opticon being applied in border management can be 
clearly seen in the words of Mark Cregor69, managing director of the Accenture Border 
and Identity Services70, while commenting on the EU proposals for the creation of the 
EES and RTP:  
 
“These proposed changes in border management processes 
offer a unique opportunity for border agencies to not only 
improve the experience of the vast majority of travellers and 
simplify life for the frequent flyer, but also to focus security 
efforts on the small minority of travellers who pose a risk or to 
whom entry or exit from a particular country should not be 
permitted.”. 
 
Some scholars have pointed out possible exclusionary practices that 
technological solutions can bring when applied in border control, in the case of e-
passports that are essential to the use of e-gates, certain countries with weak 
institutional structures struggle to guarantee even the basic right of identity registration 
after birth and certainly are not be able to provide their citizens with biometric travel 
documents71.  These individuals would be automatically excluded of the ABC system, 
and would face higher barriers for movement and reinforced border control checks by 
being placed in the “high-risk” travellers group for simply not having access to e-
passports in their country of origin72. Moreover, the standardization of e-passports 
among developed countries can deepen the digital inequality currently existent 
between countries around the globe. 
Already in the late 90s the Polish philosopher and sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
pointed out for the exclusionary aspect of the globalization, and the existent dichotomy 
between freedom of movement and spatial segregation. In Bauman’s perspective, 
globalization has a different meaning for different societal groups. For the elite 
globalization means freedom of movement, while for the poorest it means being 
                                                          
69  Tracey Caldwell, Market Report: Border Biometrics.  
70 Accenture is a multinational company which provide services in the areas of strategy, consulting, digital, 
technology and operations. Their clients are both from the private sector and governments, and its Border and 
Identity Services division works with the EU SIS II and VIS systems.  
71 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
Palm, Conflicting Interests in the Development of a Harmonized EU E-Passport. 
72 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
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trapped in the local73. What is seen nowadays is that between these two extremes 
exists a third societal division of individuals who can also circulate and tend to relate 
globalization with freedom of movement. They represent the majority of travellers, who 
can prove to have sufficient means to be allowed to legally cross borders for the 
purpose of tourism, study or business, even though they are not members of the elite.  
Although the notion of being trapped in the local can seem too radical, it is not 
entirely unrealistic. Those who do not have sufficient means to prove themselves as 
good consumers or capable of sustaining a comfortable living are not eligible for the 
RTP system or even to receive permission to legally cross the EU external border. For 
some authors, the current immigration policies combined with the increasingly use of 
technology for control and surveillance are not only excluding unwanted migrants, but 
also pushing them to illegal routes where they are exposed to conditions of bare 
survival and biological existence74.   
The EES system for instance has its creation justified by the Council of 
Europe75 with promises of helping to: “reduce border check delays and improve the 
quality of border checks by automatically calculating the authorised stay of each 
traveller”, “ensure systematic and reliable identification of overstayers” and 
“strengthen internal security and the fight against terrorism by allowing law 
enforcement authorities access to travel history records”. However, its possible side-
effects, as pointed by Hendow, Cibea and Kraler76, can jeopardize the security of the 
EU and endanger the life of travellers, who in order to avoid being classified or 
identified as overstayers, would seek illegal migration routes boosting the demand for 
smugglers and expanding human trafficking networks around Europe.  
On the other hand, travellers who already have access to the ABC system, 
mostly EU citizens, seem to sustain a positive perspective regarding the use of 
technological solutions at border check points. In a recent study conducted by Eticas77 
about data protection in automated borders, it was revealed that when using 
                                                          
73 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalização: as conseqüências humanas (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor Ltda, 1999). 
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automated systems in border control, travellers perceived the interaction with 
technology ‘less aggressive’ while crossing borders, when compared to a manual 
border control performed by border guards, and they tend to think that machines are 
less susceptible to discrimination. Border guards also see the neutrality and 
impartiality of technology with a positive perspective, but they also highlight the 
importance of human interaction in the identifications of suspicious behaviour78. 
This positive perspective regarding to the discrimination aspect is also shared 
by the European Commission who affirms that “Biometric technology can reduce the 
risk of mistaken identities, and of discrimination and racial profiling.”79. The idea behind 
this affirmation is that with the use of ABC, the decision of who is allowed to cross the 
border is automatic, as the machine verifies if the biometrics recorded in the travel 
document matches with the biometrics of the passenger. If they match, entry 
permission is granted. However, questions have been raised regarding the “neutrality” 
of technology, especially about the algorithms being used and how the e-gates are 
programmed, for example discriminatory algorithms may stop individuals with certain 
nationality or those who are coming to Europe in high-risk flights80.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 European Commission, Smart Borders Package: Questions & Answers (Brussels, 6 April 2016). 
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2. Methods and Data 
 
In order to successfully achieve my research aim and answer to my research 
questions, I compiled different sources of primary and secondary data, that together I 
believed could best represent the current reality and future panorama of the EU border 
control system, along with the perspectives of its main stake-holders and end-users.   
The data collected is both of quantitative and qualitative nature, bringing to this 
research proper scientific basis for the discussion of a such a complex and challenging 
issue.  Challenging in a sense that the automatization of border control checks and 
the implementation of sophisticated large-scale identification systems based on 
biometrics are a very recent phenomenon. Thus, no substantial scientific literature 
related to possible impacts on fundamental rights, particularly on the right of non-
discrimination could be found during the process of literature review conducted at the 
initial stage of this research.  
Although scarce, most of the academic literature found consisted of articles 
published in scientific journals related to the issues of data protection and data privacy. 
The importance of addressing such issues when accessing the ethical and societal 
impacts of new border control technologies is undeniable, however other crucial 
aspects regarding the protection of fundamental rights seem to remain uncovered.  
The present research focuses on one of those uncovered aspects, by 
investigating, analysing and discussing how the implementation of new technologies 
are affecting and will affect the issue of discrimination in border control practices. My 
first source of primary data consists of an online survey questionnaire developed, 
published and distributed by the BODEGA project research team. The survey 
questionnaire responses present the experiences of travellers crossing the EU 
external borders, including Europeans and third-country nationals, and travellers who 
have used automated gates and those who have performed their border checks 
interacting with border guards.  
A second source of primary data concerning other stakeholders involved in the 
border control system consists of questionnaires developed by the European 
Commission, which were used in a public consultation on the Smart Borders Package 
conducted in 2015. The questionnaires were filled by individuals, carriers, tourism, 
transport and infrastructure operators, EU public authorities, intergovernmental and 
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non-governmental organizations related to areas of migration, border control, 
fundamental rights and data protection.  They were developed aiming to gather the 
perspectives, opinions and expectations of public authorities and organizations 
regarding the current state of EU border control system and the Smart Borders.  
As source of secondary data, I will be using the report on the results of the 
public consultation issued by the European Commission and publicly available on their 
official website, in which it is possible to find results of quantitative data analysis of the 
responses of all participants, including individuals who participated at the public 
consultation anonymously and therefore did not have their filled questionnaires with 
their identification published.   
In this chapter, I will present the materials, methods used for data collection 
and analysis, the results of the analysis and brief discussions for each source 
separately, starting with the BODEGA Travellers Survey followed by the Public 
Consultation on the Smart Borders Package. 
 
2.1 BODEGA Travellers Survey 
 
The present master’s thesis is a contribution to the BODEGA- Proactive Enhancement 
of Human Performance in Border Control project led by VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland Ltd. and funded by the European Commission Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme. BODEGA’s research team developed a 
traveller’s online survey questionnaire to better understand the experience of travellers 
while crossing the Schengen border and their point of view regarding different aspects 
of border control.  
The survey was developed taking into consideration the European Code of 
Conduct for Research Integrity81 and the six cornerstones of the Responsible 
Research and Innovation (RRI) framework82, which are ethics, societal engagement, 
gender equality, open access/science, science education and governance. This 
framework is an integral part of the BODEGA project and a cross-cutting issue of the 
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https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/hi/h2020-ethics_code-of-conduct_en.pdf 
82 European Commission. Responsible Research and Innovation: Europe’s ability to respond to societal 
challenges. 2014. doi:10.2777/95935. 
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Horizon 2020 programme for the promotion of public engagement in research and 
innovation.   
The survey questionnaire contains a variety of question types, combining both 
open-ended and close-ended questions such as: Likert-type scales, multiple choice 
and rank order questions. Close-ended questions do not cover the issue of why, 
however they are effective for understanding general aspects of the research. When 
combining both close-ended and open-ended questions it is possible to have a general 
and in-depth understanding of travellers’ perspective of border control and allows them 
to define what they perceive as central issues of current practices. In total, the survey 
was composed by 46 questions and it was translated into nine languages. The 
responses given by the participants to open-ended questions that were not written in 
English were all translated to this language before the data analysis was conducted.  
In August 2017 the survey questionnaire became available in BODEGA’s 
official website83 and its initial distribution strategy was to share it through newsletters 
and email lists of companies and institutions participants of the BODEGA project 
consortium, social media platforms and during dissemination events in which the 
project was presented, such as conferences and fairs.   
At the time this thesis was written the survey was still open for participants in 
BODEGA’s website. Until 30th of January 2018, when I compiled the data to be further 
coded and analysed, 143 participants from Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and 
South America had sent their responses in the condition of anonymity, all of which 
were collected and archived following EU research ethical regulations. QuestBack was 
the internet-based program used for collecting the data and it automatically coded all 
closed-ended questions’ responses.  In regard to open-ended question responses 
which could not be automatically coded, in order to have a better understanding of the 
data set I preferred to conduct the analysis by identifying common themes. I choose 
this rather than breaking the data into small sections by using key words for coding 
and systematization, since the number of responses received was smaller and their 
size and content varied substantially.   
The majority of participants did not need a visa to travel to the Schengen area 
or were holders of a resident permit card for a Member State, only 20.5% claimed to 
                                                          
83 “Proactive Enhancement of Human Performance in border control”. BODEGA. Last Modified 01 apr, 2018. 
http://bodega-project.eu/ 
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need a visa. Regarding their gender 58% were males and 42% females, the largest 
age group of participants were of those 25 to 34 years old (35%) followed by 35-44 
years old (30%). As a result of the initial survey distribution strategy, the level of 
education of most participants was high with 93% having at least completed a 
Bachelor’s degree. In a total of 143 participants, 113 were EU, EEA or Switzerland 
citizens and 30 were third-country nationals (TCN) of which 3 claimed to have never 
crossed the Schengen border and therefore could not reply to all questions of the 
survey.     
The survey was divided in five themes: background information, general 
perception and experience, ethics, last border control and border control in general. In 
order to focus on the specific research question of this master’s thesis I selected 13 
questions, those of which were more connected to discriminatory aspects and 
practices. The questionnaire did not have any question addressing directly the issue 
of discrimination in border control, but it had open-ended questions in which travellers 
could better describe their experiences and opinions, and close-ended questions 
concerning their interaction with border guards, treatment received and their 
perception of the e-gates.  
To understand better the possible differences in the experiences of TCNs and 
of EU, EEA and Switzerland citizens who have the right of free movement in the 
Schengen area according to the EU law, I separated the data between these two 
groups, by creating a new category named “citizenship” that allowed me to distinguish 
the responses of the selected questions and to analyse them separately and 
comparatively while using the method of cross-tabulation for close-ended quantitative 
questions. Cross-tabulation is a common quantitative data analysis method used for 
analysing survey responses since it enables the researcher to understand the relation 
between multiple variables, to find patterns and trends that otherwise would be difficult 
to identify in the raw data84. The software used for the organization and analysis of 
this quantitative data was Microsoft Excel 2016 MSO.   
 
 
 
                                                          
84 Daniel F. Chambliss and Russell K. Schutt, Making sense of the social world: Methods of investigation (Sage 
Publications, 2016). 
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2.1.1 Results 
 
When asked “What do you think about crossing the Schengen border in general?” the 
participants could choose between 5 different facial expressions the one that best 
represented their level of satisfaction. Third country national (TCN) respondents 
seemed to be more satisfied than EU citizens with Schengen border control, 70% of 
TCNs chose the faces which represented being satisfied or very satisfied, compared 
to 53% of EU citizens.  
  
IMAGE 2: Facial expressions used in the BODEGA travellers survey.85 
 
Some questions of the survey were addressed only to travellers who had 
experience using the ABC system, the aim was to understand the level of satisfaction 
with the system and possible existent challenges. TCN travellers who had used the 
system were either satisfied or very satisfied with their experience using the European 
e-gates, as were the majority of EU travellers (IMAGE 3). For instance, travellers who 
did not use the e-gate or had their border control performed partially automated and 
partially by a border guard were asked about their experience of interaction with border 
guards. Once again the majority of TCN travellers seemed to be generally satisfied 
with their experience: 20 were either satisfied or very satisfied, 9 were indifferent and 
1 dissatisfied. However, regarding EU travellers even though the majority were also 
generally satisfied, 31 respondents affirmed to be indifferent, 5 dissatisfied and 1 very 
dissatisfied (IMAGE 4).    
 
                                                          
85 “Proactive Enhancement of Human Performance in border control”.  
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IMAGE 3: Travellers’ level of satisfaction with their experience of using the e-gate.  
  
 
IMAGE 4: Travellers’ level of satisfaction with their experience of interaction with border guards.  
 
  The issue of fair treatment at border control checks was directly addressed in 
the questionnaire with a multiple-choice question that was followed by an optional 
open-ended question about possible improvements in the border control system that 
could make travellers’ experience better.  Eighty-three percent of EU travellers felt 
they were treated fairly during the process of border control, and a slightly higher 
percentage was seeing among TCN travellers, with 88% of them also affirming to feel 
being treated fairly. 
According to the responses of those who willingly replied to the open-ended 
question, the improvements pointed out by TCNs can be divided in three themes: 
better access to information about the border control process, faster border control 
checks and better treatment of travellers. Other concerns related to discriminatory 
practices in border control were also mentioned by travellers, as seen in the response 
bellow:  
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More neutral and fair treatment with Latin Americans. Unnecessary questions 
were made during the conversation with the European guard.   
 
 Another issue mentioned by the respondents was transparency and more 
information about border control check procedures and rights. For example, TCNs 
emphasized the importance of understanding the reasons why travellers are being 
questioned and their personal information being verified: 
 
The border control should explain the reasons why they are verifying our 
personal information (or confirming, depending on the case). Specially for 
those who are crossing the border for the first time, unaware of the type of 
question the guarders would ask.  
 
In the case of EU travellers, part of the most common improvements themes 
cited were similar to those mentioned by TCN travellers, such as better treatment 
provided by border guards and the provision of more information about the border 
control process. For example, an EU traveller emphasized the need for more 
information and civility from the border guards: 
 
Better information before the passage. A little more civility on the part of the 
border guards.  
 
 However, faster border checks was the improvement most emphasized by EU 
travellers, in a total of 30 responses received, 17 were related to time, speed and 
efficiency. Along with a possible improvement, some travellers sent also their 
complaints as a form of justification for the proposed improvement, which were mainly 
about long waiting lines, lack of coordination between airlines and the border control 
check system and low efficiency of the system.  For instance, an EU traveller 
suggested a revision of the current division between EU and non-EU passports for the 
optimization of border checks: 
 
There is a distinction between EU and non-EU passports. On same airports this 
can be changed, probably based on arriving planes/passengers but on some 
airports it is more or less fixed for a flight between two Schengen states there 
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is a huge line on the EU passport gates and almost nobody on the non-EU 
Gates. This could be optimized.  
 
Since in the group of EU, EEA and Switzerland citizens more travellers have 
used automated borders, another major theme identified during the analysis was 
improvements of the e-gates. For instance, a traveller suggested improvements on the 
design of the e-gates used at Helsinki-Vantaa airport: 
 
…at Vantaa airport there isn’t enough space between the “footprints” on the 
ground and the wall behind you if you have a backpack on, so you have to take 
it off which unnecessarily complicates things and slow the whole process down 
(as people who don’t travel often don’t realise they need to take off and so stand 
too close to the screen and so the machine can’t recognise the face etc). 
Heathrow's implementation of the e-Gate works better as the screen is more 
towards the front of the gate; you have to stand diagonally within the gate which 
leaves room for your backpack and any other luggage within the e-Gate. 
Vantaa's is also difficult to fit other carry-on suitcases due to the layout of the 
e-Gate "booth". 
  
The last section of the survey was dedicated to the topic of border control in 
general and all travellers, regardless if they had crossed the Schengen border before 
or not, were asked to give their opinion about a series of statements in which they 
could agree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, strongly agree, strongly disagree or 
simply choose the option “I don’t know”.  
When replying to the statement “The use of e-gates makes me feel like a 
criminal or suspect.” 70% of TCN travellers disagreed or strongly disagreed and none 
has agreed or strongly agreed with it. Similarly, in the case of EU travellers 74% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, but four travellers have agreed and one strongly 
agreed. The majority of EU travellers also agreed that e-gates allow them to avoid 
potential communication problems with border guards, but TCN travellers, who  mostly 
had no experience using the machines had diversified opinions: 14 agreed or strongly 
agreed and 9 claimed not to know if the e-gates can allow them to avoid 
communication problems.  
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The statement “I feel more secure when border control is performed by e-gates 
than when it’s performed manually by a border guard.” was the one that travellers 
seemed to be more reluctant to either agree or disagree with (IMAGE 5). Finally, when 
asked if they would prefer to use an e-gate instead of a manual control performed by 
a border guard the opinions of both group of travellers were relatively similar with 42% 
of EU travellers and 50% of TCN travellers agreeing and strongly agreeing.  
 
 
IMAGE 5: Travellers’ opinion about feeling more secure when border control is performed by e-gates.  
 
After stating their opinions in a multiple-choice format, travellers were given the 
opportunity to freely write their thoughts about border control in general. In total 28 
travellers wrote their suggestions, thoughts and complaints, of which some themes 
identified were related to the treatment received by travellers, impartiality of border 
guards and discrimination. For example, TCNs and EU citizens mentioned in their 
responses possible differences in the treatment received by different groups of 
travellers:  
 
The borders inside Schengen are great, however while entry I feel that there 
are differences in the treatment of non-Europeans, especially Latin Americans.  
 
I have seen that border police officers were very rude and obtrusive to “Arab 
looking” travellers.  
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Comparisons between border guards and automated borders were also made, 
for instance a TCN traveller stated that e-gates could be better in certain contexts in 
which border guards cannot be trusted to be impartial: 
 
In Finland I prefer what I think is safer - an actual border guard. In countries 
where police or officers can't be trusted to be impartial I would prefer e-gates. 
Before this survey I had not thought about the problems of data security 
regarding e-gates. 
 
Another TCN affirmed to have good and bad experiences while crossing the 
borders, however the traveller thought the European border control system was too 
invasive: 
 
I have had good and bad experiences while crossing the borders I think the 
system is too invasive, even though I understand it is still necessary! I hope one 
day I will not need to go through border check point and the free movement 
between countries will be worldwide!  
  
 Finally, it was possible to observe European traveller’s concern regarding the 
functionally of the current border control system, its safeness and the possibility of 
reintroducing Schengen internal border controls: 
 
My experiences are positive in tone, however, I am worried about the 
functionality of the system. The Schengen system is now under a particularly 
high pressure, since I'm left with a view that it has been possible to arrive at the 
EU territory without documents and to move within the Schengen area 
continuously, as all countries do not seem to comply with the requirements of 
the system in the same way as Finland. There is a threat that all countries will 
introduce border controls, thus disrupting the whole system. 
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2.1.2 Discussion 
 
The survey questionnaire focused on individuals’ experiences and perceptions of the 
current EU border control system and of changes being conducted for the 
improvement of its security and efficiency. During the analysis of the responses given 
by travellers, TCN and EU citizens seemed to have very similar opinions and 
perceptions in various aspects of the system, they also seem to share a similar vision 
on necessary improvements and had similar complaints.  
 Interestingly in some parts of the questionnaire TCNs showed to have a more 
positive perspective and to be more satisfied with the border control system and their 
experiences than EU travellers. For instance, a slightly higher percentage of TCNs felt 
they were fairly treated during border check, they were also more satisfied with their 
interaction with border guards and none of them agreed that e-gates make them feel 
like criminals.   
At the beginning of this research, before conducting the data analysis I 
expected different results. In my perspective, TCNs were likely to have a more 
negative perception of European border control checks and possibly would be more 
dissatisfied with their experiences than their European counterparts, especially in the 
case of manual border control conducted by border guards. I also expected that TCNs 
would clearly show preference for automated borders, seeing them as more neutral, 
less aggressive and reliable than border guards for the performance of border control 
checks. However, the responses given in the questionnaire and the results of the 
analysis show that less than half of TCNs would prefer to use e-gates instead of 
manual border control, and half were unsure or disagree that they would feel more 
secure performing their border control with e-gates.  
Such unexpected results are possibly linked with specificities of the data set 
sample. With the initial survey distribution strategy used by the BODEGA project 
research team, mostly individuals with a high level of education were reached by the 
distribution channels, resulting in a total of 93% of the participants having at least 
Bachelor’s degree completed. Therefore, what the sample truly represents is the 
experiences and perspectives of highly educated individuals, who are like to be those 
qualified by border authorities as “bona fide” travellers.  
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Bona fide is a Latin word used as an adjective for something or someone that 
is genuine, legitimate or sincere, in a literal translation it means “with good faith”86. In 
the context of border control, the term is often used to refer to legitimate trustworthy 
third country nationals, who are considered to represent low risk to the territory they 
are entering87.The process of border crossing is facilitated for bona fide travellers 
especially with the implementation of automated borders controls and the idea of 
filtering through profile88.  
Previously, only European citizens who accepted to be pre-registered and 
voluntarily provided their personal data to be stored in large-scale data systems were 
able to benefit from quick border crossings. However, with the creation of the 
Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) bona fide third country nationals who 
frequently travel to the EU became also able to benefit from open and quick borders. 
The participation requirements for the RTP, which is being currently applied at a 
national level in some European countries enlightens the determinant indicators used 
for distinguishing between “bona fide/desired” and “untrusted/undesired” travellers, 
which mainly are: nationality, wealth, employer and travel history89.   The requirements 
and indicators used to measure individuals’ eligibility limits the accessibility to the 
programme to an elite class, bringing implications for the RTP feasibility and non-
discriminatory capacity90. 
The merger of risk prevention perspective with border security that has been 
seen in the recent years, brought focus on the individual and risks that each person 
can represent. The question of being an EU citizen or not seems to be gradually losing 
its importance in a border control system increasingly dominated by the logic of risk 
management, in which what truly matters is if a traveller is considered to be “low-risk” 
or “high-risk”. Valsamis Mitsilegas explains in his book The criminalisation of migration 
in Europe: Challenges for human rights and the rule of law, the implications of this 
merger for the respect of fundamental rights91:  
                                                          
86 Synonym of Genuine. “Bona Fide”. Oxford Dictionaries. 2018. 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bona_fide 
87 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The criminalisation of migration in europe: Challenges for human rights and the rule of 
law (New York: Springer, 2014): 33-35. 
88 Didier Bigo. "The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – 
Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts." Security Dialogue 45, no. 3, 2014. 209-225. 
89 Hendow, et al., Using Technology to Draw Borders. 
90 Ibid.   
91 Mitsilegas, The criminalisation of migration in Europe. 
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“Movement is monitored on the basis of profiling – and the 
establishment of individual, subjective assessments on each 
traveller. Migrants are criminalised as they can be deemed as 
‘suspects’ under these assessments and their freedom of 
movement curtailed accordingly. The introduction of the concept 
of ‘bona fide’ traveller is extremely worrying in this context.”. 
 
The similarity in the responses of this survey questionnaire provided by 
European and non-European travellers demonstrates the effectiveness of the Ban-
opticon. Regardless of their nationality, travellers profiled as bona fide who represent 
low security risks are not those who are being the target of surveillance. The high 
levels of satisfaction of both groups of respondents can therefore be critically analysed 
considering the Ban-opticon structure of the current border control system, developed 
to be as smooth and seamless as possible for most travellers with increased controls 
for a minority of “risky” individuals under suspicion.  
The “normalized” travellers who are considered to be trustworthy can enjoy the 
benefits of not being under suspicion, including the quickness of high technology and 
hassle free interactions with border guards. Such benefits create the imaginary of open 
borders, and the perception of being able to move freely leads travellers to mistake 
speed with freedom92.    
The “Smart Borders” makes the EU border crossing process even more 
appealing for both authorities and individuals, since it allows to improve security with 
increased surveillance in a way that is almost imperceptible for the majority of 
travellers. They do not sense being watched and profiled since they are not stopped. 
They even contribute to the surveillance by voluntarily providing their information in 
order to “benefit” from the efficiency and comfort of the system, as explained by Didier 
Bigo93: 
 
“They love the ‘smart’ borders, because they are watched but 
are not stopped. They participate in this surveillance; they 
perform it; they even contribute to it by entering their data into 
                                                          
92 Bigo, The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control. 
93 Ibid. 
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the systems of control, thereby paying for the speed and comfort 
that are promised. The invisibilization of the dataveillance for 
well-off, normalized travellers does not make them freer, just 
less aware that they are at risk of becoming ‘abnormalized’. This 
mechanism can explain why the system is ‘smart’, provoking 
greater acceptance on account of its ‘seductive’ aspect.”. 
 
However, for the minority of individuals who are considered “abnormal” or 
“risky” the “Smart Borders” means complicated border crossings, numerous ID checks, 
general increase in control and surveillance starting already at consulates in their 
country of origin. As described by Bigo94, these travellers are permanently under 
surveillance and are transformed into objects of suspicion. They are not referred to as 
bona fide travellers, and they certainly have different perceptions and experiences of 
border crossings than those who are seen as such. For instance, as observed in the 
responses for open-ended questions, the issue of discrimination and mistreatment 
were mentioned with regards to specific groups of travellers for whom border guards 
were rude and obtrusive. A respondent from Latin America directly addressed the 
issue of discrimination by emphasizing the differential treatment received by the border 
guard at the booth who made “unnecessary” questions and behaved in an impartial 
manner in the perspective of the traveller.  
 Considering the survey results and the similarity of opinions and experiences 
of high-educated TCN and European travellers, it is possible to observe the 
implications of the Ban-opticon structure in the experiences of “normalized” individuals 
who are considered bona fide and undergo more lax controls, and of the “abnormal” 
ones who are considered risky by the authorities and therefore face reinforced 
controls. 
 
 
2.2 Public Consultation on the Smart Borders 
 
In 2015, the European Commission organized a public consultation on the Smart 
Borders Package aiming to gather opinions and views on it for the development of a 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 
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revised proposal to be presented to the European Council and the European 
Parliament, but also aiming to collect new ideas and knowledge related to the 
Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) and Entry/Exit System (EES) systems and 
their possible impacts95. The targets of the consultation were individuals (especially 
third country nationals who crossed or intended to cross the Schengen external 
borders), public authorities (in particular EU Member States and Schengen States), 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (mainly those related to 
migration, fundamental rights, protection of third country nationals and data 
protection), carriers and transport, tourism and infrastructure operators (e.g. airports).   
The consultation was opened from 29 July 2015 to 29 October 2015 and made 
available on a Commission dedicated website created for the exclusive purpose of the 
consultation. The distribution channels used for the promotion of the consultation 
included social media platforms, official EU Delegation websites and the Commission 
website. The European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the EU Agency for 
large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA) also cooperated with the Commission to boost the 
distribution of the consultation by disseminating information across civil society actors, 
and informing members and observers of the eu-LISA Management Board.  
Even though a diversified distribution strategy was used with a variety of 
distribution channels, including direct contact with potential participants to inform about 
the consultation, as in the case of the BODEGA Travellers Survey the number of 
responses gathered was lower than hoped for. In total 101 responses were received: 
62 coming from individuals of which 9 were non-EU citizens; 11 from carriers, 
transport, tourism and infrastructure operators; 14 from organizations; and the 
remaining 14 from public authorities including police, border guard, municipalities, 
regional council, ministries, supervisors and even an EU border assistance mission96.  
Four different questionnaires were developed specifically for each group of 
participants, but all structured in the same manner and divided in to seven sections: 
general information, biometric identifiers, accelerating the border crossings for non-
EU citizens, data retention period, law enforcement access to the data, the abolition 
of passport stamping for non-EU citizens, and finally a section for comments and other 
                                                          
95 European Commission. Public Consultations. (European Union, 2015). Last update: 12 may, 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2015/consulting_0030   
96 European Union. Report On The Public Consultation On Smart Borders. 2005. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/results_of_the_public_consultation_on_smart_borders_en.pdf 
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questions97. The questionnaires were composed of close-ended and open-ended 
questions in addition to short informative texts in each section for a better 
understanding of the topics being discussed. These were included in order to obtain 
the most accurate responses possible from all participants, including those who may 
not be familiar with a specific theme addressed in the questionnaire.  
The public consultation results, questionnaires and list of participants from 
organizations, public authorities, carriers and transport, tourism and infrastructure 
operators were publicly available on the European Commission Migration and Home 
Affairs website98. Participants from the “Individuals” group remained anonymous as 
were their responses, however the questionnaires completed by public authorities, 
organizations, carriers and operators were all publicly available on the same website. 
Some public authorities opted to send their responses in the form of position papers 
or formal comments, instead of filling the questionnaire.  
Responses to open-ended questions written in a language different than 
English, were translated to English before the data analysis was conducted. As it could 
be observed while analysing the material gathered by the BODEGA Travellers Survey, 
receiving responses to open-ended questions was quite a challenging task. Not all the 
participants replied to the proposed open-ended questions, and those who did, they 
replied in different manners. Some responses were very detailed and abstract, in some 
cases sentences were left unfinished for exceeding the number of characters 
available. However, in other cases the responses were giving using only one word, or 
short sentences saying just “no more comments”.  
Following the common process of thematic analysis for qualitative data was not 
possible in this case. As described by Braun and Clarke99 the process consists of 
different stages, starting with the researchers’ familiarization with the data, followed by 
the creation of initial codes, search for potential themes, revision of themes, definition 
of nomenclature of each theme and the final stage of elaborating a report. As the 
responses gathered varied substantially on their size and content, after familiarizing 
with the data I was unable to break it into small sections for generating the initial codes, 
                                                          
97 Ibid. 
98 European Commission, Public Consultations. 
99 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke. "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3, no. 2, 2006. 77-101. 
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so in order to have a better understating of the data set I proceeded to the identification 
of common themes.  
For the purpose of this study, I focused mainly on the responses given by public 
authorities and organisations, first in order to understand the valuable information they 
could give on the current state of the EU border control system, the different 
dimensions of “Smart Borders”, the implications of the use of technology and 
information systems for security and the respect of fundamental rights. Secondly, to 
compare the perspectives of the authorities and of the organizations that mostly are 
representatives of the interests of civil society.   
 
2.2.1 Results 
 
A compilation of the results from both close-ended and open-ended questions related 
to the topic of this thesis that are still considered to be up-to-date will be presented 
below, following the same sequence and nomenclature of the themes of the public 
consultation questionnaires. A thematic division of the results enables a clearer 
observation of which aspects of the “Smart Borders” were addressed by the 
questionnaire and of the different perspectives between and within each group of 
participants. 
 
The use of biometric identifiers 
 
According to the results report published by the European Commission100, the majority 
of respondents in all groups agreed on the necessity of the use of biometrics, with the 
exception of organizations, in which 8 out of 14 participants were against the use of 
biometrics due to the potential violation of fundamental rights and risks for data 
protection. For those who supported the use of biometric identifiers, the main 
advantages mentioned were enhanced security, data reliability and improvements on 
the speed of border checks.  
In the case of individuals, particularly third country nationals, 7 out of 9 
respondents expressed a positive perception regarding the use of biometric identifiers 
in border control. Nonetheless, when asked about specific types of biometrics such as 
                                                          
100 European Union, Report On The Public Consultation On Smart Borders. 
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fingerprints and facial images, 4 out of 9 TCN respondents affirmed that the necessity 
of giving their fingerprints for crossing the border might discourage them to travel to 
the Schengen Area. Regarding facial images, similar results were observed with 3 out 
of 9 respondents stating they would feel discouraged. Within the total group of 
individuals, 43% believed biometric identifiers could bring an actual improvement to 
the reliability of border control.   
A substantial difference in the responses of public authorities and organizations 
regarding the use of biometrics in border control could be observed. The vast majority 
of public authorities believed that biometric identifiers have the potential to improve 
border checks reliability and were in favour of using a combination of two biometric 
identifiers: a facial image with a limited number of fingerprints. The most common 
justification given when asked about the reasons for favouring a combination of two 
biometric identifiers was that together they could produce a higher certainty of 
identifications and a reduction in error rates. For instance, the Regional Council of 
South Karelia101 argued that only one biometric identifier is not sufficient for reliable 
identification:  
 
Just one mean does not provide full certainty on persons identity. Both are fast 
procedures and don’t affect fluent border crossing.  
 
A similar argument was used by the House of Representatives of the States 
General in The Netherlands102 that also mention specific difficulties that each type of 
biometric identifier could have when implemented at different border check points:  
 
In the context of security, combining facial recognition and fingerprint data offers 
the best guarantees. Facial recognition is difficult in a moving train, however, 
and on some external borders it can be difficult to take fingerprints in very cold 
weather. 
                                                          
101 The complete questionnaire filled by the Regional Council of South Karelia can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_south_karelia_en.pdf 
102 The position paper sent by the House of Representatives of the States General in The Netherlands can be 
found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_position_paper_smart_borders_house_of_representa
tives_en.pdf  
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Only two of the public authorities participating were against the use of 
biometrics identifiers in border control in any form: the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 
Both authorities questioned the real necessity of using biometrics and the lack of 
evidence confirming that any other less intrusive means, such as alphanumerical data 
is not sufficient to effectively verify a person’s identity.  When asked if biometric 
identifiers would either improve or jeopardise border control reliability, the EDPS was 
uncertain and provided an explanation about why the capacity of biometric identifiers 
for improving reliability was questionable:   
 
This depends on the accuracy of the system used to match biometric 
information. According to the Technical Study, the total number of border 
crossings in 2025 is estimated at 887 million. If we assume that the system 
matching biometric information will match individuals incorrectly to the tune of 
1%, on such a large scale, 8.870.000 travellers would be affected. These 
mistakes could lead either to situations where the traveller is blocked at the 
border (because of low quality of fingerprints taken initially etc.) or in being 
incorrectly identified as a person of interest.  
 
Contrary to what was seen in most responses of the public authorities, more 
than half of the participant organizations were against the use of biometrics itself, 
some of them believed that their use would even jeopardise the reliability of border 
checks, in case of data errors and for failing to properly identify individuals’ 
vulnerabilities. For instance, the Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)103 expressed a series of concerns regarding 
potential negative impacts that the use of biometrics could bring for the respect of an 
individual’s fundamental rights: 
 
Through the use of biometrics, a proper identification of individual vulnerabilities 
at the border could be hindered. For example, the right to asylum may be 
affected and specific vulnerabilities not identified. Data connected with a 
                                                          
103 The complete questionnaire filled by PICUM can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_picum_en.pdf 
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biometric identifier should be correct, up to date and of high quality (ie entry 
bans shall be removed as soon as they expire). An expired alert for arrest that 
has not been deleted may threaten the right to security and liberty of the person 
concerned. 
 
Potential negative implications of biometrics that could endanger the right of 
free movement were also mentioned by the American based organization Access 
Now, which also highlighted in its response the vulnerabilities related to the use of 
databased systems for controlling the movement of people:  
 
Based on evidences gathered from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 
biometric identifiers can serve as reliable indicators of a person’s identity. 
However, there is a need to ensure that the data connected with the biometric 
identifiers are correct and of high quality. Errors in the databases can take 
place, leading to individuals being wrongfully apprehended, arrested or 
prevented from travelling.   
 
The issues of discrimination and the criminalization of foreigners were also 
mentioned by organizations that were against biometrics and in favour of the sole use 
of alphanumerical data for border control purposes.  For instance, Caritas Europa104 
declared itself to be against the collection and use of personal biometric data of third 
country nationals due to its potential to be used by law enforcement in criminal 
investigations and to further discriminate and criminalize foreigners and minority 
groups:  
 
Collecting a huge amount of private data from third-country nationals could 
result in discrimination and criminalisation if the database is used systematically 
in crime investigation. The example of the Swedish police register in which 
Roma people were added on the basis of being Roma show that compiling 
private data, especially when third-country nationals (Smart Borders) or 
                                                          
104 The complete questionnaire filled by Caritas Europa can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_caritas_en.pdf 
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minorities are concerned, create a clear risk of ethnic profiling and use of data 
by the police based on the nationality. 
 
 
Process to accelerate border crossings for non-EU citizens 
 
In this next theme about accelerating border crossings for TCNs, once again the 
majority of all groups agreed on the necessity to accelerate the process for TCN 
travellers and also supported the idea of creating a European RTP. The main 
advantages of the program mentioned by its supporters were improved mobility, 
reduction of time for crossing the border, enhanced security with its pre-vetting 
mechanism and potential support for the Union economy. Within the group of 
individuals, 61% of participants supported the availability of RTP to non-EU citizens, 
including 8 out of 9 TCN. However, 39% of individuals were against the 
implementation of RTP for seeing it as a form of segregation between travellers of 
different classes, for considering it unfair to pay for participating in the program and 
having access to accelerated border crossings, and for having concerns about security 
checks conducted in automated borders. 
In the organisations group, 53% of the participants agreed on the need to 
accelerate the border control check process for TCN travellers. When questioned 
about the RTP 11 out 14 participants supported the initiative considering its potential 
for improving the efficiency of border checks. Organisations against the 
implementation and availability of the programme for TCNs expressed concern with 
the potential negative impacts it could bring for the respect of travellers’ fundamental 
rights. The European Association for the Defence of Human Rights (AEDH)105, for 
instance, questioned the discriminatory nature of the RTP and the validity of travellers’ 
consent for enrolling in the programme when few or no alternatives are available: 
 
The RTP system as it is currently designed risk infringing various human rights. 
Discrimination: It is very likely that "the access to RTP will depend on status, 
income, language skills and education" (EESC) or even sensitive data like 
                                                          
105 The complete questionnaire filled by AEDH can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_aedh_en.pdf 
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ethnic origin or race. Data Protec: If the RTP is the only solution to avoid long 
lines, the user's consent can't be considered as freely given. Also, to store 
biometrics in a centralised database is very risky. At most, they could be stored 
in the personal token. 
 
The majority of public authorities also agreed on the necessity of accelerating 
the border process for TCN travellers, and the exact same number of public authorities 
and organizations showed support for the RTP initiative and availability for TCNs 
coming to the Schengen area. An interesting perspective was brought by some of the 
authorities working at the front line of the border control system. They perceived as a 
positive impact of the implementation of the RTP a potential ease in the burden of 
border guards work at check points, who could then be able to focus on other travellers 
and tasks.  Future scenarios of the EU external borders and estimates of the number 
of travellers expected to cross the borders were mentioned by the Finnish Border 
Guard and the Hellenic Police, in order to confirm the necessity of accelerating and 
facilitating border crossing for non-EU citizens:  
 
There is an evident need to facilitate frequent travellers' border crossings. At 
BCPs, in average (annually) 70-90 % of crossings are made by 10-20 % of 
individuals. This enables border guards to focus more to the rest of the traffic 
flow - this increase fluency and also security. What lanes RTPs are using, EU 
or specific RTP lanes, should be assessed. There should be some flexibility in 
this regard. (Finnish Border Guard) 
 
It has been estimated that in 2011 alone foreign travelers made a €271 billion 
contribution to the EU economy. Additionally, every year more than 700 million 
EU citizens and TCNs cross the EU's external borders. This number is expected 
to rise significantly in the future. By 2030 the number of people at European 
airports could increase by 80%. In view of the above, it is critical to further 
facilitate non-EU citizens border crossings in a safe and secure framework. 
(Hellenic Police)    
 
 However, while the necessity of accelerating the border control process was 
confirmed by the majority of the authorities, security aspects were not forgotten. The 
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response given by the Finnish municipality of Parikkala106 shows a clear concern with 
security in border control check procedures: 
 
If checks are done thoroughly when submitting the application, the process is 
ok. Acceleration of border crossings is needed, but security and safety should 
be guaranteed first. 
 
 
Data 
 
When questioned about the proposed periods for data retention in the EES the 
opinions of the participants varied greatly. In the case of non-overstayers, travellers 
who entered the Schengen area with a short-term visa and did not exceed the legal 
time permitted for their stay (90 days within 180 days), the majority of public authorities 
agreed the retention period should be longer than 181 days. The main argument used 
to justify their opinion was that an extended period of retention enables faster border 
controls by avoiding re-enrolment of travellers to the system. For instance, the Finnish 
Border Guard107 mentioned in their response an additional advantage for passengers 
when applying longer data retention periods: 
 
Retention time should be longer than 181 days for practical reasons. It would 
be time consuming and slow down the border checks if third country nationals 
visiting Schengen once a year or every second year (this is common frequency 
of travelling) should each time go through roll-out. Longer retention time would 
be beneficiary for passengers since positive travel history could be seen in 
border checks, and then would ease the checks to be carried out. Positive travel 
history in ESS could also facilitate visa issuing process.  
 
                                                          
106 The complete questionnaire filled by the Finnish municipality of Parikkala can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_parikkala_en.pdf 
107 The complete questionnaire filled by the Finnish Border Guard can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_finish_border_guard_en.pdf 
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Organizations related to the fields of security and defence, such as the 
European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the Aerospace and Defence Industries 
Association of Europe presented a similar vision of most public authorities and 
supported a longer data retention period. However, the majority of organization 
participants were either against data retention itself or favoured a maximum period of 
180 days, for understating as being sufficient for the purpose of determining the extent 
of an authorised short stay. Individuals and carriers mostly favoured a data retention 
period of 181 days or longer, for its potential to speed-up and ease border checks.   
For overstayers, a period of 5 years for data retention was proposed by the 
European Commission and rejected by half of the individuals who participate in the 
consultation. They were in favour of a shorter period and expressed concern with data 
protection issues, possible difficulties for the correction and update of data recorded 
in the system and the importance of considering the reasons for overstaying. The 
majority of organizations also rejected the proposed 5 year period and were in favour 
of a shorter period. They expressed concern with possible increased profiling risks 
and data misuse that long periods of data retention can bring. Some of the 
organisations, such as the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD)108 and the European 
Digital Rights (EDRi)109, questioned the real purpose of collecting travellers’ personal 
data and the legality of using a public consultation as a tool to determine the extent of 
data retention periods: 
 
The retention of data must be justified by the purpose of the original data 
collection. Given that the main purpose of the EES would be detecting and 
preventing overstayers there is no need for long retention periods. Especially 
as there is no common EU approach on how to deal with overstayers. Moreover 
the system should only contain data which are necessary for verifying the entry 
and exit. The individual must have the right to appeal in case the determination 
as overstayer is incorrect. (EKD) 
 
                                                          
108 The complete questionnaire filled by EKD can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_ekd_en.pdf 
109 The complete questionnaire filled by EDRi can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_edri_en.pdf 
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The determination of the length of a data retention period should not be left to 
the result of a public consultation but to comprehensive proportionality and 
necessity tests conducted by legal experts. (EDRi) 
 
Half of the public authorities’ participants agreed with the 5 year period 
proposed, since it is equal to the biometric passport validity. Four participants favoured 
a data retention period longer than 5 years, having in mind the potential value of the 
information collected to law enforcement authorities and for the investigation of 
criminal activities. However, the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development110 favoured a data retention period shorten than 5 years and of only 
alphanumerical data, claiming to be unnecessary to retain any kind of biometric data 
for the purpose of calculation the duration of a traveller’s stay:  
 
Concerning all data retention, there is no need to retain biometrics. For the 
purpose of calculation of authorised stay, only alphanumeric data would be 
necessary. Concerning overstayers, the purpose of data retention should be 
more clearly outlined, as well as the guarantees and controls. This is a 
particularly important issue considering the recent ECJ ruling on the Data 
Retention Directive, which found insufficient guarantees and controls in the 
large-scale collection of personal data. 
 
  
Law enforcement access to the Entry/Exit System data 
 
Opinions regard to the access of law enforcement authorities to the EES were divided 
among the participants of the consultation. Public authorities were mostly supportive 
seeing the potential benefits of the system for security, mainly on detection, prevention 
and investigation tasks for the combat of terrorism and international criminal activities. 
For instance, the Hellenic Police111 highlighted the already prevailing involvement of 
                                                          
110 The complete questionnaire filled by the ICMPD can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_icmpd_en.pdf 
111 The complete questionnaire filled by the Hellenic Police can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_hellenic_police_en.pdf 
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the police on tasks of border control in many Member States and the importance of 
law enforcement authorities (LEAs) and border authorities work closely:  
 
Border control in many MS are been exercised by the Police. Organized crime 
and terrorism has indisputably international characteristics, which are not 
limited to a MS borders. Radicalization and especially ISIS attacks in EU’s soil 
proved that the MS LEAs must be aware about border crossing flows and work 
more closely with each other, always in the framework of protecting human 
rights and freedom especially concerning privacy and data protection. 
 
For the French Ministry of Interior112 the data of some travellers collected and 
archived by the EES can be decisive for criminal investigations and should be 
available for law enforcement authorities as soon as the system is implemented:  
 
The entries and exits of some travellers are information often decisive and 
relevant in police investigations, which justifies the access of these services to 
the entry-exit system from its start-up. 
 
A slight majority of individuals and carriers were against EES data access to 
law enforcement authorities, and justified their position with concerns about the lack 
of sufficient data security and possible errors that could lead to further stigmatization 
of foreigners.   
Only 12 replies were received from the group “Organizations” on this matter, of 
which 5 supported the EES data access to law enforcement authorities. Those which 
were against it mentioned the risks for fundamental rights and the reinforcement of the 
criminalization of third-country nationals. The European Association for the Defense 
of Human Rights (AEDH) addressed in their response the differentiation on the 
treatment of European and non-European citizens and highlighted the need of 
confidentiality when dealing with asylum seekers data:  
 
                                                          
112 The complete questionnaire filled by the French Ministry of Interior can be found at:   
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_french_ministry_of_interior_en.pdf 
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Such an access is going against the principle of purpose limitation since it would 
give law enforcement authorities access to personal data taken during 
migratory processes. That would be particularly dangerous for asylum seekers 
whose data has to be kept confidential. Moreover, it would mean, in essence, 
that every non-EU national is considered as a presumed suspect, unlike EU 
nationals still presumed innocent with their biometrics protected. Nothing can 
justify this difference in treatment. 
 
 The Protestant Church in Germany highlighted the increased risks for the 
occurrence of racial and ethnical profiling when granting law enforcement access to 
EES information:  
 
Law enforcement access entails the strong risk that the information collected 
related to race, ethnicity, health and religious beliefs could be used as the basis 
for (racial and ethnical) profiling and therefore discrimination of people falling 
within these groups. The blanket collection of data and LEA would constitute 
clear violation of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter (CJEU C-293/12). 
 
 
Asylum Seekers  
 
In the last section of the questionnaire the particular case of asylum seekers coming 
to EU was raised as subject of discussion. Public authorities and organizations were 
asked through an open-ended question if they would expect any possible impacts of 
the EES or RTP systems on asylum seekers, their responses could be divided in three 
groups: those who believed there would be no impact whatsoever since they were not 
subjects of the Smart Borders legislative proposal; those who perceived positive 
impact with a possible facilitation of identification of undocumented travellers through 
biometric data; and finally those who expected a negative impact on the safety of 
asylum-seekers and for the respect of fundamental rights.   
Whilst half of the public authorities did not reply to this question, of those who 
did the majority expected no impact, two expected positive impacts and only the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development mentioned a possible negative 
impact. For the International Centre, asylum-seekers who first enter the EU as tourists 
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and later claim asylum are those more likely to be affected, since they could be wrongly 
considered overstayers with a system like the EES.  
Nonetheless, the majority of organizations expected negative impacts that 
would possibly infringe fundamental rights, such as the right for protection and non-
discrimination. For instance, the Protestant Church in Germany was concerned with 
EES bringing an additional burden to the asylum-seekers by requiring the provision of 
personal data to be stored in the system and the possible denial of entry for individuals 
who need protection and might refuse giving their biometrics. The German 
organization also expressed their discontentment with the Smart Borders Package 
itself, for in their view “placing emphasis on the need to protect the EU from foreigners 
rather than supporting much needed policies of welcoming migrants and refugees.”113.   
Another participant organization, Caritas Europa, raised attention to elevated 
risks of discrimination and potential division of travellers between first and second-
class citizens with the adoption of the proposal: 
 
The proposal could result in the creation of first- and second-class citizens. It 
would create discrimination between on one side EU nationals and third country 
nationals who participate in the RTP and asylum seekers on the other side who 
would have to give their fingerprints as well as potentially other biometrics 
identifiers each time when crossing an EU border. Asylum seekers living in 
Europe should not be treated less of a person. This sort of discriminatory tactics 
is more likely to create frustration and lead to terrorist attacks than not. 
 
  
2.2.2 Discussion 
 
The Public Consultation on the Smart Borders was developed as a contribution for the 
preparation of a revised legislative proposal for the implementation of the Smart 
Borders Package. The first proposal made by the European Commission in 2013 
presented to the European Parliament and Council raised a series of discussions 
regarding the of Package’s feasibility, technical and operational aspects, costs 
                                                          
113 EKD: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/docs/consultation_030/contribution_ekd_en.pdf 
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involved and potential fundamental rights violations. Thus, a series of measures was 
taken by the Commission for the improvement of its legislative proposal and for the 
further preparation of a revised proposal to be presented in 2016. Some of the 
measures taken were the development of a technical study114 and a cost study115 in 
2014, one-year pilot project116 conducted by eu-LISA and the public consultation in 
2015.  
 The revised legislative proposal117 was adopted by the European Commission 
in April 2016 and considerable changes could be observed when comparing it to the 
first proposal. For instance, the idea of establishing a centralised Registered Traveller 
Programme for third-country nationals was withdrawn. The regulation for the 
implementation of an Entry/Exit System was maintained in the revised proposal, 
however this time law-enforcement access to information recorded in the system was 
included, allowing national law-enforcement authorities and Europol to use the system 
for criminal investigation and identification118.  Another significant change was 
regarding the data retention period, which previously was proposed 181 days for non-
overstayers and 5 years for overstayers, in the 2016 proposal data from all TCNs 
would be retained in the system for 5 years.  
Two main points can be delineated from the outcome of the revised proposal 
bearing in mind the results of the public consultation. First, the data collected related 
to the adoption of the RTP and its potential impacts for fundamental rights is still 
relevant even though the programme was excluded from the newest Smart Borders 
Package proposal. Its establishment in an EU level might have been withdrawn, 
however interested Member States have developed their own RTP and applied it on 
a national level in some of Europe’s busiest airports, such as Schiphol Amsterdam 
                                                          
114 European Commission. Technical Study on Smart Borders – Final Report (PWC. 2014). 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-
borders/docs/smart_borders_technical_study_en.pdf 
115 European Commission. Technical Study on Smart Borders – Cost Analysis (PWC. 2014).  
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-
borders/docs/smart_borders_costs_study_en.pdf 
116 eu-LISA. Smart Borders Pilot Project Report on the technical conclusions of the Pilot (European Agency for 
the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, 2015). 
https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/Smart%20Borders%20-%20Technical%20Report.pdf 
117 European Commission. Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council (Brussels: European 
Union, 2016). Https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-
borders/legal-documents/docs/20160406/regulation_proposal_entryexit_system_borders_package_en.pdf 
118 European Parliament, Smart Borders: EU Entry/ Exit System. 2016. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586614/EPRS_BRI(2016)586614_EN.pdf 
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Airport119 and Frankfurt Airport120. These national RTPs differ from the centralised 
version described in the first “Smart Borders” proposal mostly by its limited availability, 
only third-country nationals from some specific countries can enrol, and by being free 
of charge for travellers.  
Second, the most contentious topics of the consultation were the access of law-
enforcement authorities to EES data and the data retention periods. Within the aspects 
discussed in the consultation, these were the ones more likely to bring negative 
impacts for the protection of fundamental rights, including increased risk of data 
misuse, of racial and ethnical profiling and differentiation on the treatment of 
Europeans and non-Europeans. Despite the majority of individuals, organizations and 
even some public authorities being against the access of the EES to law-enforcement 
authorities, or favouring a prior evaluation of necessity after two years of the EES 
implementation, in the revised proposal law-enforcement access to the system is 
assured since the beginning of its operation.  
An even paradoxical outcome was seen regarding participants opinions on the 
proposed data retention periods. The majority of organizations were either against 
data retention of non-overstayers or supported a maximum period of 180 days, in the 
case of overstayers the majority rejected the proposed 5 years, and so did half of the 
individuals consulted. Public authorities mostly supported a longer data retention 
period for non-overstayers and half agreed with the period proposed for overstayers. 
In the revised proposal of the Smart Borders, the differentiation between non-
overstayers and overstayers was withdrawn and a period of 5 years of data retention 
in the EES was established for all TCNs crossing the EU external borders. Part of the 
justification provided by the European Commission121 for this decision was:  
 
“The five year data retention period reduces the re-enrolment 
frequency and will be beneficial for all travellers, while allowing 
the border guard to perform the necessary risk analysis required 
by the Schengen Border Code before authorising a traveller to 
enter the Schengen area. For the border guard the systematic 
                                                          
119 Schipol Amsterdam Airport, Registered Traveller Programme.  
120 Federal Police, EasyPASS-RTP.  
121 European Commission. Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council (Brussels: European 
Union, 2016). Https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-
borders/legal-documents/docs/20160406/regulation_proposal_entryexit_system_borders_package_en.pdf 
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deletion of the EES record after 181 days as proposed in 2013 
would have removed any trace of the third country national 
recent history of entries and exits from the Schengen area which 
is required for a risk analysis.”. 
 
This justification shows another side of the importance of retaining individuals’ 
personal data for a longer period in the EES system. The necessity of retaining 
travellers’ data for risk analysis was not mentioned by public authority participants of 
the consultation, they mostly referred to the benefit of faster border checks that longer 
data retention periods can bring. The Finnish Border Guard also mentioned an 
additional benefit for travellers, who by having their data retained could then develop 
a positive travel history, which would facilitate the processes of border checks and visa 
issuance for them. However, it seems that being “beneficial” for travellers and for 
speeding border checks is a bonus that the needed long data retention period can 
bring. This bonus is used extensively by the authorities to justify their preference for 
long data retention periods, and in the case of the European Commission to justify 
their decision of establishing a 5 year data retention period which all foreigner 
travellers will be subjected to.  
The contradictions between the views of the participants and what was 
delimited in the revised proposal of the Smart Borders raise questions about the real 
meaning of the consultation. In principal, the development of a public consultation 
indicates an interest of the European Commission to understand the perspective of 
end-users and stakeholders involved in the process of migration and border control. 
As mentioned by the Commission itself, one of the main objectives of the public 
consultation was to “collect views and opinions to underpin the on-going impact 
assessment of the Smart Borders package and the policy preparation of the revised 
proposal…”122. Thus, one may question the real value attributed to the results obtained 
with the responses of participants for the development of the revised proposal, since 
it may seem that the consultation was conducted merely to legitimize a new legislative 
proposal than to address and include the concerns and interests of the civil society.  
After reading the revised proposal and its outcomes, the adherence of the 
public consultation to the principle of transparency seems uncertain.  Not in any part 
                                                          
122 European Commission, Public Consultations. 
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of the public consultation was it mentioned the necessity of retaining travellers’ 
personal data for extended periods, in order to conduct risk analysis tasks. Neither 
was it mentioned by the European Commission which developed the consultation, nor 
by the public authority participants, including those working in the front line of the 
border control system, such as border guard and police.  
Another issue raised in the public consultation by a variety of organizations and 
a few public authorities concerning the implementation of the “Smart Borders” was the 
issue of proportionality. When discussing the use of biometrics, data retention and the 
access of law enforcement to the EES system, for some participants the necessity of 
using and storing biometric information for calculating an individual’s duration of stay 
was unclear, and the proposed amount of biometric data to be collected would lead to 
the creation of the world largest data base system. This seems rather disproportionate 
to the main purpose of the EES. Many of the organizations participants and the 
European Data Protection Supervisor expressed concern with potential problems of 
data management that massive collection of information combined with long periods 
of retention could bring.  For instance, data connected to biometric identifiers that are 
not collected with precision, or up-to-date, for example an expired alert that has not 
been deleted, may restrain traveller’s freedom of movement and endanger their 
security.    
The access of law enforcement to the system was seen by some organizations 
as a move against the principle of purpose limitation, since the EES was developed 
for calculating traveller’s length of stay and to tackle the issue of overstayers. 
Therefore, travellers’ personal data would be collected in migratory process when they 
arrive at border check points, for the purposes of migration and border control, not for 
criminal process and investigations. 
 In principle, third-country nationals whose data will be retained in the EES are 
not suspect of any crime and should not be treated as such. Allowing law-enforcement 
authorities to access this data contained in the system may further criminalize the 
image of the foreigner as those who should not be trusted and must be under 
continuous surveillance.  By using a data-base created for the purpose of controlling 
the entry and exit of TCN as a tool for criminal investigations, it creates space for 
further discrimination and criminalization of foreigners.   
What started as a system to electronically calculate the length of stay of non-
European travellers in the Schengen Area, who entered with a short-term visa, quickly 
 55 
 
became a tool of security and surveillance.  The responses of public authorities and 
organizations related to security and defence to the questionnaire of the public 
consultation, and the revised proposal presented by the European Commission in 
2016 confirm the establishment of a risk management framework in the EU border 
control system.  Further, it attests the veracity of concerns raised be the academia a 
decade ago when border control and migration started to shift from being exclusive 
security issues to risk management issues.  
Already in 2008, scholars from the Paris School of Security Studies, such as 
Didier Bigo expressed concerns regarding the empowerment of security agencies and 
risk experts in border management to a level in which they would be responsible for 
the creation of strategies and decision-making, leaving a limited space for politics in 
the area123. In a border control system like the current one, characterised by the 
increasing use of information and communication technologies for identification, 
surveillance and risk analysis related tasks, information provided by technical studies 
and experts are more valuable for the process of decision-making, than political 
discussions and the interests of the civil society. Not only is the space for politics in 
the area now limited, but also the space for protection of fundamental rights, with 
different representatives of the civil society (churches, human rights organizations, 
data protection agencies) being gradually excluded from the process of decision 
making by having their voices unheard.  
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3. Surveillance and fundamental rights in border control  
 
The practice of surveillance is not a contemporary phenomenon in political history. 
The ability to tell who is who and to produce foresight knowledge for strengthen 
security and defence have been valued by governments for centuries.  Already in the 
5th Century BC, the Chinese General and military strategist Sun Tzu emphasized the 
importance of acquiring knowledge on the people one should rule and about one’s 
enemies. In his widely known text “The Art of War”, Sun Tzu stated “If you know the 
enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”124.  
 What is contemporary is the form in which surveillance is practised in the era 
of globalization, particularly in democratic countries, where the principles of freedom 
and equality are the fundamental bases in which politics and societies are constituted. 
Along with freedom and equality comes the principle of transparency and privacy, 
which together creates little space for practices of surveillance and control. Therefore, 
it seems rather difficult to imagine a public acceptance of an extended system of 
control and surveillance being implemented in a democratic state.  
 Paradoxically, it is exactly in democratic states, such as EU Member-States, 
where technologies of identification, control and surveillance are constantly being 
developed and implemented. As explained by Peter K. Manning “The point appears to 
be that privacy and human rights must be defended in democracies, yet democracies 
to defend themselves are moving evermore toward systematic data gathering and use 
in the processes of ordering.”125. Since the early 2000’s, it is possible to observe an 
increasing use of information and communication technologies, especially large-scale 
data systems which store individuals’ personal information.  With the increasing 
incidence of terrorist attacks happening in the EU, the capability of accessing valid 
and accurate information of individuals gained an additional value for the authorities.  
 Practices of surveillance and control of individuals occurs now under the scope 
of a new form of governmentality known as the Ban-opticon. In societies which human 
rights are valued and defended, the Ban-opticon allows such practices without 
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triggering rejection of the public opinion and diminishing the freedom of circulation. All 
of which is possible by facilitating the movement of the majority of individuals, while 
performing a focused surveillance through the extensive use of identification 
technologies. They enable to target only certain groups of individuals considered 
abnormal and risky, who must undergo reinforced border control checks.    
 The question of risk is particularly interesting to understand EU security 
policies, particularly those related to border management. Risk assessment tools have 
had a fundamental role in the creation of security strategies and justifications for 
increasing surveillance and control. In order to generate acceptance, public actors and 
law-enforcement authorities need to provide proper justifications for conducting 
practices which might be contrary to societal values and human rights principles. 
Sentiments of fear and uncertainty are often used to gain public acceptance, for 
instance to increase the amount of individuals’ personal data being collected, stored 
and shared through different data-based systems across the EU. Public authorities 
tend to justify such practice as necessary for the management of societal risks.  
The assessment of security and societal risks was often conducted by the 
intelligence and risk analysis experts, responsible to provide governments with 
information and foresight knowledge to be used in the development of strategies for 
the protection of the state and its citizens against domestic and international threats. 
Risks scenarios were then created to be used as guides by public agencies and 
authorities in the preparation for future challenges and threats.  
The responsibility of prevention and protection against security threats, once 
exclusive of the intelligence realm, is now shared among law enforcement authorities, 
including border guards.  In the case of the EU border management, FRONTEX is the 
agency responsible to conduct risk assessments and to develop scenarios of 
alternative and possible future environments for border management, taking into 
consideration domestic and global pressures126. Annually, the agency publishes its 
risk analysis report covering security risks affecting the EU external borders, the report 
contains: situational pictures of the previous year regarding mainly surveillance, border 
checks and cross-border crimes; analyses; and scenarios127.    
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Results of risk analysis and trend reports, produced by governmental agencies 
and sometimes private companies, present possible challenges and threats from 
possible futures. The information provided by these reports is then used for the 
development of technical solutions to prepare states for the possible future outcomes 
or for preventing them. However, an inherent contradiction surrounding this risk 
management logic and the constant need of developing security solutions can be 
perceived. While attempting to reach ultimate security levels, insecurity and 
uncertainty are generated with the continuous creation of future scenarios and their 
potential threats. As explained by Benjamin Taylor128 when discussing about the 
development of technological solutions to security:  
 
“Security technology then, along with the discourse and policies 
that surround it, may very well create insecurity in the sense that 
they heighten fear and uncertainty. Once fear and uncertainty 
are increased, it is easy to attempt to reduce these with 
technological solutions, thus setting in motion a vicious cycle.” 
 
 The sense of uncertainty creates a state of emergency, in which quick 
measures should be taken for the prevention of potential threats and to assure safety. 
The immediate need to react opens space for an accelerated introduction of new 
technologies, and leaves critical examinations and considerations as secondary 
aspects. As seen in the case of the European automated border control system, the 
implementation of e-gates and biometric identifiers is spreading around EU border 
check points without proper assessment of ethical and societal impacts. Research 
projects like the BODEGA were requested and funded by the European Commission 
afterwards to fulfil this gap, and to contribute for the improvement of ethical and 
societal issues.  
Analysing EU external border security through its practices as suggested by the 
Paris School of Security Studies revels a gradual shift of migration and border control 
from a political to a technical risk management question. Strategies and decisions 
before discussed in a democratic environment, with space for political debates, the 
involvement of non-governmental organisation and the civil society, are now taken in 
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private spheres by security authorities and technical experts129. According to Bigo130, 
these actors’ legitimization for taking decisions and developing border management 
strategies comes from the belief of them being the true holders of knowledge, different 
from political actors who are professionals of politics.  
With the increasing automatization of the border control system, it seems 
natural to perceive the question of migration and border control as a technical issue 
that can be better managed by professionals of the field. Since they are able to make 
decisions and create solutions for eventual problems based on their knowledge, 
technical studies and risk assessments. European Union institutions, especially the 
European Commission seem to corroborate with this logic, as it could be observed in 
the first Smart Borders Package proposal, in the preparation of its revised version and 
its outcome.   
A border control system based on risk management can implicate on the 
systematic categorization of travellers, as it can be already seen with the distinction of 
travellers between those who represent low-risk and high-risk. In addition, the space 
for actors outside the scope of security and risk-management become continuously 
reduced, as it could be observed with the participation of religious actors, human rights 
organizations and data protection agencies in the public consultation on the Smart 
Borders and the later exclusion of their considerations in the preparation of the final 
revised version of the Smart Borders proposal.  
The automatization of borders and implementation of asocial techniques, those 
which do not require human interaction, can bring the idea of neutrality and impartiality 
for the border control task of sorting individuals between those who are allowed to 
cross (low-risk) and those who are not (high-risk). However, the definition of “low-risk” 
and “high-risk” individuals itself is still unclear, as is the criteria used to determine in 
which category each individual falls, opening for debate the weight nationality, 
ethnicity, race and religion might have if used as determinants of an individual’s 
potential risk.     
Individuals considered to be “high-risk” by the authorities, might not even be 
able to reach an official EU external border check point, since the border management 
system as it is now starts its control and policing tasks outside the EU territory. These 
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individuals can have their request to cross the EU external border denied already in 
their country of origin, during the process of visa issuance at an EU Member-State 
consulate.  What becomes clear when analysing the current EU border management 
system is the exclusionary aspect of the Ban-opticon as a form of governmentality, as 
explained by Bigo131: 
 
“The Ban is the way to exclude and to normalize, to play with 
the different possible futures and to try to monitor the future to 
control the present. So, it is a belief in technologies of 
“morphing”, of “profiling”, of computer data bases and their 
capacities to “anticipate” who will be “evil” and who is “normal”, 
who is “allowed to benefit from freedom of movement” and who 
is excluded or controlled before they can use their freedom of 
movement.” 
  
 Territorial borders consist of a mechanism of exclusion by their very own nature, 
they exist to separate the unknown outside from the familiar inside132. While analysing 
the current state of EU border management and the data-based systems in use, it was 
possible to perceive a social sorting capacity of the systems. Different from Bauman’s 
vision on the social stratification of mobility in the era of globalization133, the usage of 
large-scale data systems, such SIS II, VIS, RTP and EES (yet to be implemented) 
seem to have created a modern way to differentiate individuals based on their potential 
risk. Until 2017, personal data of around 40 million individuals (mostly third-country 
nationals) were recorded in EU large-scale data systems, such as SIS II and VIS134.  
 The current transformations of the EU border control system seem to be driven 
by the necessity of improving mobility and its security capacity. However, the 
improvement of mobility appears to focus on only a certain group of individuals 
classified as bona fides. For these individuals, surveillance is designed to provide open 
borders, while for others it is designed to distinguish and restrain.  Regarding the 
improvement of security, the discursive and political securitization of migration 
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appears to be the force behind the increasing implementation of border surveillance 
technologies.  
A relation between the figure of the foreigner and security risks has been 
constructed throughout the years in political discourses given by public authorities and 
international organizations, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States and of the Madrid attacks in 2004. Since then, the idea of threats 
coming from abroad has been repeatedly emphasized by media outlets, which played 
an important role on influencing the public opinion for the acceptance of the extensive 
use of identification technologies, surveillance and reinforced controls over the 
movement of foreigners.  
 The notion of threats coming from abroad was strengthened to the point where 
the presumption of innocence seems not applicable to foreigners anymore. When 
reading the responses given by public authorities and security organisations to the 
questionnaire of the Public Consultation on the Smart Borders Package135, it was 
possible to identify the view that non-European travellers who aim to enter the 
Schengen area must prove their innocence and trustworthiness, in order to be granted 
permission of entry.  
For instance, the European Organization for Security (EOS) pointed to the 
capability of “Providing TCN and migrants the right means to prove their bona fide 
movements”136 as one of the reasons why the “Smart Borders” are necessary for 
making the EU more secure and welcoming. The Finnish Border Guard mentioned the 
benefit that longer data retention periods could bring to TCNs by providing them with 
a positive travel history, which could be accessed by the authorities and facilitate their 
process of border crossing and visa issuance137.  
In principle, TCNs who are arriving at the EU external borders or applying for a 
visa are not suspects of any crime, and they should not be treated as such. The climate 
of suspicion around the figure of the foreigner endangers the protection of fundamental 
rights, opens space for unlawful discriminatory practices, creates division within 
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societies and put the security of TCNs at risk. Further, practices of discrimination and 
exclusion can create sentiments of frustration which may lead to extremism and 
radicalization, increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks occurrences138.  
The results of the public consultation reveal public authorities’ main concern of 
enhancing security levels at EU external borders. They seem to perceive the borders 
as the entrance of external threats which could disrupt the stability of EU Member-
states and the safety of its citizens. Organized crime and terrorism were linked to 
management of border crossing flows, and mentioned while justifying the necessity of 
conceding law-enforcement authorities access to the information recorded in the 
Entry/Exit system. A system which its main declared purpose is to registrate third-
country nationals date of entry and exit from the Schengen Area, in order to calculate 
the duration of stay of those who are entering the territory with a short-term visa and 
to detect overstayers.  
Nonetheless, public authorities seem certain about the potential contributions 
of the EES system to tasks of prevention, investigation and combat of cross-border 
crimes. The system is planned to be fully functional by 2020 and the access of law-
enforcement authorities to its information was established in the revised proposal of 
the Smart Borders presented by the European Commission in 2016. The Commission 
seems to agree on the importance of the system for practices of law-enforcement and 
explains its potential contribution in the following manner: “The access to the Entry-
Exit System by law enforcement authorities will constitute an additional instrument to 
prevent and combat terrorism and serious crime, by tracking travel patterns and 
combatting document and identity fraud.”139.  
 After its implementation, EES has the potential to become one of largest data-
based systems in the world, since it will store personal information, including 
biometrics, from every TCN crossing the EU external border. The necessity of 
collecting travellers’ biometrics for calculating the length of their stay is yet unclear, 
which lead most of the organizations to discuss the system’s proportionality while 
responding to the public consultation.  In the perspective of the organizations, the 
massive amount of data collection, long periods of data-retention and access to law-
enforcement authorities outside the scope of border control are not in accordance to 
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the declare purpose of the system. Moreover, travellers will provide their personal 
information and biometric data while crossing the border, for migration and border 
control tasks, not for its potential use in criminal investigations.  
  Law-enforcement access to the EES system is perhaps the most contentious 
aspect of the Smart Borders proposal. It raises questions regarding not only the real 
purpose of the system, but also about the real purpose of the Smart Borders. In a ban-
opticon structure, the “Smart Borders” reveals itself as another tool for refined 
surveillance and strengthened control of foreigners. It is welcomed by the authorities 
for its potential to collect an amount of individuals’ personal data never seen before, 
without extraordinary efforts and public resistance, since in order to cross the border 
travellers will have to provide guards with their information.  The majority of travellers 
will be glad to do so, considering the potential benefits of facilitated and faster border 
crossings when they are entering or leaving the Schengen area.  Perhaps this is 
exactly what characterises the most interesting feature of the “Smart Borders”, which 
is its ability of being welcomed and praised publicly by individuals, public authorities, 
security organizations and tech-companies, even though it has a potential to further 
endanger the protection of fundamental rights.   
The transformation of border control into one of the cornerstones of counter-
terrorism policy, leads to an increasing securitization of borders and migrants, to a 
level which a variety of European public authorities, ranging from border guards to 
small municipalities, share a sort of common sense on the necessity of improving 
border security at all costs. When discussing the Smart Borders Package in the 
questionnaire of the public consultation, considerations regarding the impacts of the 
Package for the fundamental rights were mention in a rather superficial manner by 
most of the authorities. Being possible to interpret that the respect for the fundamental 
rights is important, but not as important as assuring security. 
   
3.1 The right of non-discrimination 
 
In order to properly discuss the impacts new border technologies can bring to the 
respect of fundamental rights, particularly how they are affecting, or can affect the 
issue of discrimination in border control practices, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of how the right of non-discrimination is legally defined. In the European 
context, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union represents the 
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ultimate documentation of the rights of every individual in the EU, including political, 
social, economic and personal rights140. The Charter is in accordance to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and it contains six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, 
Solidarity, Citizens’ rights and Justice141. Under the title Equality, the Article 21 Non-
Discrimination142 has the following description:  
 
“1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited. 
2. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and without 
prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” 
 
 In the specific context of EU external border control, the Schengen Borders 
Code regulates the practices of border management. In its Article 7 Conduct of Border 
Checks is stated that “While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not 
discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 143. According to the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), differential treatment of individuals on the 
grounds of their nationality is not necessarily discriminatory or unlawful144. However, 
the Agency emphasizes that it is considered unlawful if the differentiation is based 
predominantly on religious, racial and ethnic aspects145.   
 As observed in the results of the BODEGA Travellers Survey, travellers’ 
perception of discrimination is mostly related to the questions of ethnicity and 
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nationality. The respondents who claim to have received a differential treatment or 
witnessed it related the border guard behaviour to their nationality or appearance, for 
instance an “Arab look”. A study conducted by FRA in 2014 evaluated the treatment 
of TCNs at entry border checks in five EU international airports146. It counted with the 
participation of 274 TCN travellers who experienced more thorough checks, and 
similar results were reported.  Half of the travellers who were dissatisfied with border 
guards’ conduct attributed the treatment received with their nationality, and a third to 
their race or ethnicity. FRA pointed a potential lack of information about border check 
procedures as a source of negative impressions and travellers’ dissatisfaction. 
 A total of 223 border guards working at the five international airports were also 
consulted during the study. They were asked about which indicators were mostly used 
for identifying irregular TCN travellers before communicating with them at the border 
check booth.  Travellers’ behaviour, nationality and country of destination were pointed 
as the three most helpful indicators for effectively identifying irregular travellers by 
most of the border guards. However, in the case of border guards working at Schiphol 
airport ethnicity was indicated as the most helpful indicator for the effective recognition 
of travellers attempting to enter the Schengen area irregularly.  
 Considering the current automatization of border control checks, with the 
implementation of electronic passports, electronic gates, biometric identifiers and 
data-systems for identification, the potential of border technologies to reduce 
discriminatory practices can be perceived.  Discrimination can take a variety of forms 
in the context of border control, and effect both EU citizens and TCNs. It can happen 
through abusive behaviour of border guards, extensive practices of profiling based 
exclusively on race, religion and ethnicity or differential treatment of travellers based 
on dress manners, gender, sexual orientation, disabilities and visual representations 
of religion.  
 The usage of ABC systems certainly brings significant changes on how border 
control checks are performed, but how it can reduce discriminatory practices and the 
perception of being discriminated by border guards when compared to the traditional 
manual border control are issues that have not yet been properly assessed by the 
academia and industry. However, it is reasonable to affirm that the systems present a 
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potential to improve the experience of travellers and in some cases to reduce the 
probability of discriminatory practices.  
For instance, in the study conducted by FRA a transgender traveller complained 
about the abusive behaviour of border guards at Fiumicino airport, who were mocking 
her during the border check process 147. With the implementation of asocial 
technologies, such as the e-gate, discriminatory incidents related to an individual’s 
gender identity can be expected to be reduced, since interaction with border guards 
would not be necessary. The same logic can be applied for discrimination based on 
dress manners and visual representations of religion, while using the e-gates 
travellers’ passport information and biometrics are verified without considerations 
regarding their clothes, accessories and religious symbols.   
 Nevertheless, the capacity of border technologies to reduce discriminatory 
practices based on race, ethnicity and nationality cannot be assured. Contrary to the 
common belief on technology impartiality, machines as the e-gates are programmed 
by technicians, who as human beings might have their own bias and follow specific 
security and migration agendas. Therefore, it is important to remember that 
technological tools do not have a rationality of their own, and above all, they are 
inserted in a particular context and are designed and implemented according to 
specific purposes. The automatization of border controls does not change the security 
framework in which border management is inserted. As seen through out this 
research, the automatization of border controls and the technologies involved in the 
process are in fact strengthening surveillance and control practices, which further will 
distinguish individuals on risk assessment bases.    
The machines perform their risk assessment tasks of profiling and sorting 
travellers, between those who are allowed to cross and those who should proceed to 
further checks with a border guard, by the using algorithms. According to the Article 9 
of the European General Data Protection Regulation, which will be applicable to all 
Member States by May 2018, the act of processing individuals’ sensitive data is 
prohibited, even if risk assessment tasks are conducted following proper 
safeguards148. Sensitive data is referred to those concerning an individual’s race, 
ethnicity, religion, political opinion or affiliation, philosophical beliefs, genetic and 
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biometric data, sex life and sexual orientation149. Under exceptional circumstances, 
their use for profiling is permitted when proved to be crucial for reasons of public 
interest, although even in this case, profiling can still be considered unlawful if it’s 
discriminatory in essence150.    
The discriminatory aspect of profiling can be subtle and indirect when 
conducted using data-based systems. For instance, when law-enforcement authorities   
are searching information on visa holders registered in the VIS for the purpose of a 
criminal investigation, it can be understood as a neutral and impartial conduct at the 
surface. However, when taking a deeper, such practices can resonate negative 
impacts for specific group of individuals, in case most of those registered in VIS are 
Africans or Asians151. Therefore, as recommended by FRA “Automated risk 
assessment or profiling would, therefore, have to be based on algorithms that are not 
primarily or solely determined by personal characteristics that reveal sensitive 
information such as, race, ethnicity, health, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs.”152  
In addition, regarding to the capacity of border technologies to reduce 
discriminatory practices based on ethnicity, FRA highlighted in its report about the 
interoperability of information systems, the dangers implicated to the use of biometrics 
at automated borders. Concerning the risk of ethnic profiling, travellers’ facial image 
collected for the purpose of identity verification may disclose the ethnic origin of the 
individual and enable automated ethnic categorization153.  While responding the public 
consultation questionnaire, the Protestant Church in Germany also mentioned an 
elevated danger of ethnic profiling with the use of biometrics in border control 
checks154.  
 It is important to note that the practice of profiling in border control already 
happened before the usage of technology and identification systems. Traditional forms 
of profiling, also known as confirmatory profiling, consist of assuming that passengers 
who have a certain pattern of characteristics represent a potential threat to the country 
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where they are seeking entry. The pattern of characteristics is defined based on expert 
knowledge and past experiences that are applied in border control to filter those who 
hypothetically can be dangerous and must be submitted to be further scrutiny. As 
pointed out by Matthias Leese155, “confirmatory profiling practices have raised 
considerable critique in terms of social sorting or racial profiling, as predefined profiles 
can include variables like gender, age, nationality, religious belief, etc.”. However, a 
set of rules regulate the practice of profiling in order to avoid fundamental rights 
violations, for instance systematic discriminatory pattern of profiling is forbidden by the 
right of non-discrimination as seen at the beginning of this sub-chapter. 
 The potential impacts of the Smart Borders system to the right of non-
discrimination were mentioned by the majority of organizations which responded to 
the public consultation. They expressed concern with the further criminalization of 
foreigners as an outcome of grating access to law-enforcement authorities to the EES 
system. Caritas Europa affirmed that allowing the use of data-bases for criminal 
investigations could lead to the criminalization and discrimination of TCNs and minority 
groups. The organization cited the example of the Swedish Police, which collected 
personal information of Roma people to be added in the police register, for the reason 
of them being Roma156. The example was cited to demonstrate the actual probability 
of TCN data recorded in large-scale systems to be used for unlawful profiling practices, 
based on ethnicity and nationality.    
 Discrimination in current border control practices can be observed in the 
exclusionary nature of the RTP, which is already fully functional in some of the 
European busiest international airports. The RTP was proposed by the European 
Commission in 2013, as a component of the Smart Borders Package, but was 
withdraw from the revised proposal of the Smart Borders. Nevertheless, some EU 
Member-States decided to develop and implement their own RTP seeking to improve 
the flow of travellers at airport border check points. The programme is designated to 
bona fide TCN travellers, however the criteria used to determinate who is considered 
a bona fide is unclear. Thus, currently only individuals from certain nationalities can 
enrol to the programme and benefit from accelerated border crossings, those being 
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holders of e-passports from:  Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States of America. All of these countries do not 
have significant records of irregular migratory movements towards the EU territory, 
which might categorize their citizens as low-risk travellers157.  
 The complexity of the border management is undeniable. Demands for 
efficiency, security, fairness and protection of vulnerable individuals are part of the 
current border control context. One of the greatest challenges faced by the EU border 
management today is to find a point of reconciliation between humanitarian and 
security aspects in the performance of its common tasks. In the midst of the border 
control process transformation, with an increasing securitization, integration, 
automatization and digitalization, particular attention must be given to the inclusion 
and assurance of fundamental rights.  
 The issue of fundamental rights in border control processes, in particular the 
right of non-discrimination is a notably sensitive topic, which must be addressed in a 
responsible and adequate manner. Potential legal inadequacies or violations may 
affect the lives of thousands of people who cross the EU external borders annually. 
Thus, when discussing the issue of discrimination in border control it is critical to avoid 
simplifications and naturalizations, that may lead a reduction of the space for reflection 
and critical considerations. For instance, when discussing the European border control 
process Benjamin Taylor158 stated the following:   
 
“The border control process is inherently discriminatory, that is, 
the purpose of performing the task is to ascertain who is, and 
who is not, allowed to cross certain spaces. How we define who 
is and who is not allowed to cross borders generally relies on a 
number of assumptions about the meaning of concepts such as 
what constitutes identity, nationality, the state, and internal and 
external security.” 
 
 When investigating and analysing the potential impacts of new border 
technologies for fundamental rights and the compliance of current border control 
practices to the legal framework, the question of technology’s acceptability goes 
                                                          
157 Frontex, Risk Analysis 2017. 
158 Taylor, Developing Qualitative Criteria. 
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beyond traveller’s satisfaction. It also involves legitimacy of practices, social and 
ethical considerations which may not be outlined at a first glance. The results of the 
BODEGA Travellers Survey and of the Public Consultation on the Smart Borders 
reveals that the majority of traveller respondents were generally satisfied with their 
experience with the EU border control system and with their interaction with 
technology. Nonetheless, as it could be observed in the course of this study travellers’ 
general satisfaction did not mean the inexistence of ethical and societal issues in 
border control practices and technological solutions in use. 
 In order to produce a responsible research, it is imperative to gain knowledge 
on deeper issues intrinsic to border management practices and its complexities, which 
often cannot be observed in a superficial level. The participation of different actors 
involved in the processes of migration and border control, including end-users, it is 
crucial to gain a deeper understanding of the complexities and contingencies of the 
system. It helps to uncover omitted issues, ambiguous practices and norms, which 
enable a reconstruction of the EU border control context according to the information 
gathered. This research process, based on the RRI framework permits the creation of 
adequate recommendations, significant societal impacts and responsible solutions159.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
159 European Commission, Responsible Research and Innovation. 
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Conclusion  
 
This study focused on answering the question of “How the implementation of new 
technologies is affecting and will affect the issue of discrimination in border control 
practices?”. Which it revealed to be a very challenging task for several reasons. First, 
discrimination is a very sensitive and complex issue, regardless of the context few 
people are willing to discuss it and many precautions need to be taken when studying 
it. Second, the automatization of the EU border control system with the implantation 
of new border technologies is a process which started very recently and is still on-
going. Thus, very few samples of academic literature could be found during the 
process of the literature review, relating the recent transformations of the system and 
the impact they may have on fundamental rights. Scientific publications dealing 
exclusively with the issue of discrimination could not be found.    
In order to reveal how discrimination occurs in the current system and how 
travellers experience it, I relied mostly on primary sources of data which contained the 
travellers’ experiences while crossing the Schengen border, including Europeans and 
third-country nationals, and the perspectives of public authorities and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. More specifically the material 
used consisted of the BODEGA Travellers Survey, created by the project research 
team in 2017, and the Public Consultation on the Smart Borders developed by the 
European Commission in 2015. 
Along with the theoretical framework, the results obtained with participants’ 
responses from the survey and the public consultation were used to re-construct the 
European border control context beyond its appearances and official descriptions. 
Omitted issues and ambiguous practices were then exposed, and it could be 
demonstrated with the support of the theoretical framework that issues related to 
exclusionary and discriminatory practices of border control are not limited to the 
process of border control checks. On the course of this study it became clear that in 
order to understand the implications of new technologies for the fundamental rights, it 
was paramount to comprehend EU security policies for border management and 
migration, in addition to the environment in which these technologies are being 
inserted.  
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The theoretical framework chosen for this study proved to be adequate for 
investigating and analysing the actors, discourses, institutions, technologies, laws and 
regulations related to migration and border management, that compose the current 
EU border control system. The Ban-opticon synthetized the form in which surveillance 
and control of individuals’ movement is currently conducted in Europe, and enabled a 
critical evaluation of border control practices. For instance, it could be observed that 
identification technologies, such as data-systems and biometric identifiers are being 
used for a continuous refinement of surveillance. In the current border control system, 
movement is facilitated for the majority of travellers, with a refined surveillance 
targeting only individuals from certain groups who are considered risky and therefore 
must undergo reinforced controls.    
The thesis has demonstrated that the usage of large-scale data systems has 
created a new form of differentiating travellers according to their potential risk. They 
are now categorised and distinguished between those who represent a high-risk and 
low-risk. Nonetheless, the criteria used to determine in which group each individual 
falls is still unclear. During this study, it was possible to observe that wealth and 
education seem to be important indicators of travellers’ trustworthiness. The further 
investigation and analysis of the indicators and criteria used to determine if a traveller 
represents low-risk or high-risk could be an interesting topic for further research in the 
area.  
During this study, it was possible to verify that the securitization of migrants and 
borders, through the notion of threats coming from abroad is still prevalent in the 
discourse of public authorities and it seems to be the driving force behind the 
development of new border technologies. In the responses provided by public 
authorities to the public consultation, organized crime and terrorism were linked to 
border management. In addition, it was possible to perceive that in the view of most 
of the authorities, third-country nationals are suspects until the contrary can be proved. 
For them, those who aim to cross the Schengen border must be able to prove their 
innocence and trustworthiness, in order to be granted permission.  
Furthermore, analysing the border control system through the lenses of the 
Ban-opticon concept revealed that the “Smart Borders” are more than legislative 
proposals and technological solutions for the improvement of border control 
performance, in fact they represent yet another tool for refining surveillance and 
strengthening the control on the movement of foreigners.  
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Regarding discriminatory practices during the process of border control checks, 
when comparing manual border checks performed by border guards and automated 
checks performed by machines, such as the e-gates, potential positive and negative 
impacts for the reduction of discriminatory practices were perceived. An automated 
border control system has the potential to eliminate discrimination based on gender 
identity, dress manners and visual representations of religion. However, ethnic 
discrimination can be further increased with the used of biometric identifiers that are 
able to automatically categorise individuals based on their ethnicity.    
Moreover, new border control technologies have the potential to generate new 
forms of discrimination. Technological solutions currently being implemented in a 
border control system, which is increasingly dominated by a risk management logic 
can produce new forms of discriminatory practices based on risk. The newer 
distinction of travellers between “low-risk” and “high-risk” is an example of what can 
be considered as a new form of discrimination in border control practices, by which 
the criteria used to determinate the potential risk of every person crossing the border 
is still ambiguous. This distinction according to individuals’ potential risk is 
strengthened with the availability of large-scale data systems, containing a massive 
amount of travellers’ personal information and used for the purpose of identification 
and surveillance.       
Inherent discriminatory features of the current border management system 
cannot be changed only with the implementation of new border technologies. In order 
to protect fundamental rights in the European borders and reduce the occurrence of 
exclusionary and discriminatory practices, a broader and deeper transformation needs 
to occur within the structure of the system and most importantly in the security policies 
for border management. As mentioned earlier in this study, the greatest challenge of 
the EU border management system today is to reconcile humanitarian and security 
aspects, mirroring the core values of European Union in its practices.  
The findings of this study confirm the establishment of a risk management 
framework in the EU border control system. When comparing the responses given by 
organizations and public authorities to the public consultation on the Smart Borders 
and the outcomes of the revised proposal presented in 2016, it was attested the 
empowerment of technicians and risk experts in the EU border control system. The 
implications of such empowerment include the transfer of the responsibility for creating 
strategies and making decisions related to migration and border control to risk experts, 
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and the further limitation of the space for political actors and civil society 
representatives in the area. Further research on the decision-making process in 
different levels of the European border control system is necessary, along with the 
implications that the empowerment of risk experts and technicians can bring for the 
respect of democratic values and the protection of fundamental rights.   
There is urgent need for further academic research on the ethical and societal 
impacts of new border technologies currently being implemented in the EU external 
borders, including additional studies covering the issue of discrimination. Considering 
the number of travellers crossing the border daily, fundamental rights violations and 
ethical inadequacies in border control procedures have the potential to negatively 
impact the lives of thousands of individuals.  
Limitations of time and length of an average master’s thesis did not permit a 
complete coverage on the impacts that new border technologies can bring to the right 
of non-discrimination, those being positive or negative. It is still necessary to 
investigate in-depth the risk categorization of travellers, how e-gates are programmed, 
what kind of algorithms are being used and what kind of technological solutions could 
be developed to reduce the occurrence of discrimination. Nevertheless, I hope this 
thesis can contribute for opening the space for further social and ethical research in 
the use of new border control technologies, and for enlightening the importance of 
critical studies analysing the continuous transformations of border control practices. 
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